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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the distinctions between “pirates” and “privateers” and 
the reasons for and usefulness of these distinctions.  The consolidation of power and 
the compromises enacted to quell religious disputes in sixteenth-century England 
allowed Queen Elizabeth to assess the problem of piracy.  In doing so, she determined 
that by sanctioning piracy through official letters of marque and reprisal thereby 
bringing pirates under some sort of government control as "privateers," she could add 
to her dwindling naval forces and add to her coffers with the spoils of these missions.   
Elizabeth’s navy had become an important issue because of the threat of 
Spanish attack and possible invasion of England.  While Elizabeth had wanted to 
focus her attentions internally on England itself, she was drawn into continental 
affairs—most the rebellion in the Spanish Netherlands.  Elizabeth found herself torn 
between maintaining peace with Spain and aiding fellow Protestants in the 
Netherlands.  During this time, the issue of pirates and privateers became most 
important.  Elizabeth had to avoid conflict because she had insufficient military 
forces.  Realizing that at her disposal were dozens of experienced sailors with their 
own ships, she began to sanction piracy by creating and encouraging a fleet of 
privateers, including Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkins.  Such an act allowed 
Elizabeth to whittle away at Spanish hegemony in the Atlantic, thereby increasing her 
own influence, culminating in the defeat of the Spanish Armada.   
The most interesting part of this creation of a privateering corps, is that all the 
while, Elizabeth and her council were issuing more stringent laws against pirates and 
those who aid pirates.  She even allowed Sir Julius Caesar to completely reform the 
Court of Admiralty in order to make the capturing and prosecuting of pirates more 
efficient.  It is this dichotomy in the context of English foreign policy that I will be 
exploring as well as the ultimate effects of these policies as they relate to the 
establishment of a tried and true Royal Navy and as they contribute to the formation 
of English trading companies like the Levant Company.
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The English government and the lives of its subjects were transformed over 
the first half of the sixteenth century.  Henry VIII, ruling from 1491-1547, began the 
religious troubles that plagued England for over half of a century by breaking away 
from the Catholic Church and establishing the Church of England.  Militarily, Henry 
realized the importance of a strong navy and poured money into the fleet and the 
newly formed administrative board.  His son, Edward (1537-1553) did little during 
his short reign to ease religious tensions and extended his father’s religious reforms.1  
Henry’s eldest daughter, Mary, from his Spanish first wife, came to the throne in 
1553 with her main agenda being the restoration of Catholicism in England.  She took 
whatever steps she felt necessary to achieve that goal—to a point.  Despite her very 
pro-Catholic views and actions, Mary did not demand a Roman Catholic succession.  
When Elizabeth, Henry’s youngest daughter and middle child, finally 
succeeded to the throne of England upon her sister’s death in 1558, she inherited a 
kingdom torn apart by religious discord, with weak defenses, a practically empty 
treasury, and vulnerable to more powerful and unified European states—chiefly the 
Spanish empire.  Aside from Catholic-Protestant schisms, Elizabeth faced 
intraprotestant divisions within her Parliament, with many wanting her to champion 
religious reform and protestant interest abroad in the form of the brewing Dutch 
Revolt before they would grant her any revenues.  As she had little royal revenue, she 
struggled to find money without having to give up her own agendas. 
Shortly after ascending to the throne, Elizabeth I found herself navigating an 
intricate web of foreign politics and diplomacy while trying to settle her own 
                                                 
1 The Prayer Book issued under Edward caused as many problems as it solved.  See Eamon Duffy, The 
Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England, 1400-1580, (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University, 1992). 
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domestic issues.  Queen of an island nation, Elizabeth began to recognize that the sea 
was where she could find power and influence and constructed policies that would 
keep England’s enemies at bay while she built up a suitable force to defend her 
struggling nation.  Alongside diplomacy, Elizabeth supported and licensed men who 
had previously been pirates in English waters, turning them into state-sponsored 
privateers practicing legal piracy against England’s enemies.  These men gained 
valuable experience on the seas and, when needed, used their military skills to 
strengthen the diminutive Royal Navy.  These maritime policies serve as a window 
into the formation of Elizabethan foreign policy.  Though Elizabeth may have fallen 
into a foreign policy that capitalized on existing practices (piracy) as a short term 
reaction/solution to the problems she faced, the way that she expanded and improved 
upon that policy constituted a departure from established maritime practices and 
diplomacy thus becoming a new and distinct method of foreign policy.2   
The distinction between “pirate” and “privateer” especially that arose under 
Elizabeth in the 1560s was crucial.  Nearly 10,000 pirates operated in England during 
the 1560s.3  By licensing certain pirates through the issuance of letters of reprisals 
and commissions, Elizabeth created a fleet of privateers that number over sixteen 
                                                 
2 G.J. Marcus supports the idea that these policies became a factor of state policy and were taken up on 
an unprecedented scale under Elizabeth.  A Naval History of England: The Formative Centuries, 
(London: Little, Brown and Company, 1961).  G.J. Marsden, Naval History of England: The 
Formative Centuries, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961), 49.  Furthermore, D.W. Waters 
argued that the skill and ability of English seamen in the later decades of Elizabeth’s reign were the 
“conscious products of a national policy carefully nurtured as it was deliberately begotten.”  D.W. 
Waters, Mariner’s Mirror, Society for Nautical Research, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1949), vol. XXXV, 41.  During wartime, piracy was generally state-sanctioned, but Philip Gosse 
claimed that Elizabeth’s policies were new in the fact that she “connived” at piracy while England was 
at “peace with the world.”  History of Piracy, (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1946), 113.  
See also Clark Hulse, Elizabeth I: Ruler and Legend, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2003). 
3 Mark Oppenheim, ed, The Naval Tracts of Sir William Monson.  Navy Records Society.  5 vols.  
1902-1914, vol. iv, 21. 
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thousand by 1582.4   These seamen weakened Spain by waging an unofficial war on 
Spanish shipping at little cost to the English state.  All the while, the Queen countered 
Spanish complaints about these “privateers” (most of which came to be known as 
“Sea Dogs”) by issuing a series of proclamations increasing the penalties for those 
found guilty of less useful sorts of piracy and publicly denouncing attacks on Spanish 
property.  The English Channel had a tradition of piracy and with the increase of 
commerce in the sixteenth century, that tradition had grown proportionately.  In 
assessing the extent of this piracy and recognizing the difficulty of controlling of 
prosecuting such acts, Elizabeth found a way to bend pirates to her will.  She had 
little funds at her disposal to try so many men for piracy, nor effectively enforce any 
piracy policy.  After all, England’s revenues were a tenth of Spain’s.  Therefore, 
somewhat more reactively then proactively at least in the beginning, she embraced 
pirates and worked to alter their agenda to more long-range piracy against England’s 
enemies instead of raiding home waters.5  By bringing pirates under her control, thus 
                                                 
4 Oppenheim, Naval Tracts, vol. iv, 21. 
5 Many scholars debate whether Elizabeth had any proactive foreign policy at all.  Charles Wilson is 
chief among them claiming that historians have simply “[rationalized] into policies ex post facto” a 
succession of shifts and “muddles” that the Queen found herself facing.  Charles Wilson, Queen 
Elizabeth and the Revolt of the Netherlands, (Berkeley: University of California, 1970), 6. G.D. 
Ramsay, like Wilson, also claims that Elizabeth had no foreign policy and merely reacted to problems 
brought before her. G.D. Ramsay, The Queen’s Merchants and the Revolt of the Netherlands: The End 
of the Antwerp Mart, (Manchester, UK: Manchester University, 1986.  R.B. Wernham also claims that 
Elizabeth experienced a “remarkable reversal of alliances” more than she fostered any “diplomatic 
revolution.”  R.B. Wernham, The Making of Elizabethan Foreign Policy, 1558-1603, (London: 
University of California, 1980), 23.  Kenneth Andrews denies that Elizabeth’s policies were in any 
way planned or deliberate and remained a private practice for Englishmen, never a governmental 
initiative.  Kenneth Andrews, “Elizabethan Privateering: the Harte Lecture, 1985,” in Joyce Youings, 
ed, Raleigh in Exeter, 1985: Privateering and Colonisation in the Reign of Elizabeth I: Papers 
delivered at a conference at Exeter University on 3-4 May 1985 to mark the four-hundredth 
anniversary of the first attempt to settle English people in North America, (Exeter, UK: University of 
Exeter, 1985), 4 and Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 1585-1603, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1964), 6, 17.  Maria Perry claims that, to some extent, Elizabeth’s policies were often 
only attempts to placate Spain.  Elizabeth I: The Word of  a Prince, (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 
1990), 30.  For further arguments on the these policies, see also Carol Levin, The Reign of Elizabeth I, 
(New York: Palgrave, 2002), Alison Weir, Elizabeth the Queen, (London: J. Cape, 1998). 
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making them privateers working in relationship to the state, Elizabeth utilized already 
skilled sailors and used their expeditions as a revenue base to replace the taxes 
Parliament would not grant her.  Elizabeth was thus creating a mercenary navy out of 
former criminals and funding the building of royal ships as well as financing other 
royal agendas through the exploits of privateers.   
The Queen also established a number of commissions with the express 
purpose of seeking out pirates and those who aided pirates as well as to discover 
corrupt Admiralty Court officials.  While these endeavors appeared to be directed at 
curbing piracy, they were primarily designed to place the actions of privateers more 
directly under royal control.  In the 1580s, Elizabeth even appointed a new High 
Judge of the Admiralty, Julius Caesar, with much authority to reform the nation’s 
Admiralty Courts and strengthen piracy laws.   
Elizabeth’s policies towards piracy and her creation of privateers provided her 
with an inexpensive way to build up English naval forces during a time of rising 
tensions with Spain while, at the same time, the language of her piracy legislation and 
her diplomatic endeavors to maintain plausible deniability and seeming distaste for 
the continuation of English expeditions throughout the Atlantic and Spanish Main 
helped to appease Philip II of Spain for a time, thereby avoiding war for over twenty 
years despite Philip and his ambassadors’ obvious distrust of the Queen’s 
participation in such affairs.   
 
 
 
  
Chapter 1: 
The Netherlands: Anglo-Spanish Relations Fractured 
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In the years leading up to 1588, the Elizabethan government could not escape 
the rebellion in the Netherlands, Spanish attempts to maintain control in those 
provinces while conquering the New World, or their efforts to sustain Spanish 
hegemony in European politics.  All of Elizabeth’s efforts to re-establish the authority 
of the Church of England made England both a sought after ally and a threat.  
Catholic Spain, already dealing with Protestant discontent and uprisings in the 
Netherlands, certainly did not welcome the Protestantization of England, while the 
Dutch hoped that religious affinity would persuade the English to help the Dutch 
emancipate themselves from Spanish rule.  Apprehensive of another Catholic 
neighbor but also wary of provoking Philip’s anger should she declare support for the 
Dutch, Elizabeth had to carefully weigh her options and the opinions of her court 
advisors and Parliament.  Elizabeth did not approve of rebels even on the grounds of 
religion, but she could not allow Spain to regain its foothold across the English 
Channel.   
William Cecil, Elizabeth’s Secretary of State, shared most of the queen’s 
moderate views.  He was willing to compromise when necessary to ensure peace and 
stability and authored much of Elizabeth’s official policy and correspondence.6  
Elizabeth’s court officials had their own ideas about religion and how to approach 
foreign policy, but under Cecil, they commonly deferred to decisions that would 
benefit England as a whole—not just further their particular interests.  This is not to 
say that there was never any dissent within Elizabeth’s council, because there 
                                                 
6 Wallace Maccaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572-1588, (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1981), 12-18, Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth, 
(New York: Knopf, 1955), 120-130. 
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certainly was opposition among the councilors.7  On many occasions, the Queen was 
beleaguered by the various requests and plans of her councilors.  However, the 
“hottest” opposition to Elizabeth’s policies came from Parliament.  The Elizabethan 
Parliament was made up of many fairly militant anti-Catholic members.  These men 
wanted decisive, aggressive action against Catholics and official military support and 
approval for Protestant rebellions such as that in the Netherlands.  Men like 
Cartwright called for “the full and whole deliverance” of Protestants everywhere.8 
But Parliament was itself divided. The “politique Machiavels” that had helped 
bring about the shift towards Protestantism, focused their attentions on England’s 
international situation and how that affected the future of their religion and power.  
They also saw the need to suppress political dissidence within English borders.  The 
“hot Gospellers” remained overly concerned with specific doctrine and forms of 
church government.9  These divisions within Parliament and between Parliament and 
the court obviously led to inefficient governance.  Elizabeth could get few bills 
pushed through Parliament because she also refused to choose either side of the 
argument.  So, facing a wall in Parliament, Elizabeth found circuitous means to get 
what she wanted.  What she wanted, and desperately needed, was money and the 
creation of a privateering fleet gave her that as well as greater military defenses.   
                                                 
7 Read, Cecil, 131-133. 
8 Cartwright, quoted in John Whitgift, Works, ed. John Ayre, Parker Society, 1851-1853, 3 vols., i, 26. 
9 MacCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 16-18. 
 
The Lord Keeper Bacon, for example, opened the Parliament of 1563 with a speech concerning the 
lack of discipline within the Church and the “lax regard” for ceremony.  42. 
 
It can be argued that Elizabeth’s council, by attempting to create compromises between the factions of 
Parliament, saw less the need to push their own agendas and beliefs and more the need to secure 
domestic stability from that experience.  For instance, Knollys, “the most reform-minded” of 
Elizabeth’s councilors, put aside his own agenda to constantly warn members of Parliament whose 
speech intruded on royal prerogative.  60-63. 
 
 9 
In this situation, her policies towards pirates and privateering gained 
importance and quickly became a cornerstone of her Dutch-Spanish diplomacy.  
English pirates naturally attacked Spanish ships carrying supplies and monies meant 
to fund the Spanish armies in the Netherlands thus, in essence, conveniently aiding 
the Dutch without the need for any formal declarations of war on Spain or support for 
the rebels.   
Through Austrian Habsburg marriage alliances, the Netherlands came under 
the control of the Holy Roman Empire.10  In 1506, Charles V, grandson of 
Maximilian and Mary, son of Philip the Handsome, the first Habsburg prince in 
Spain, and Joanna the Mad of Castile, inherited the Netherlands from his father.11  In 
1516, Charles became the first king of a united Spain at the death of his grandfather 
Ferdinand of Castile whose marriage to Isabella of Aragon in 1469 had brought the 
largest regions of Spain into alliance.12  Charles ruled until 1566 when he abdicated 
Spain to his son Philip II.13   
As Charles, known as the “universal monarch,” had vast and diverse 
territories under his control, he left much of the governance of the Netherlands, a 
                                                 
10 The Austrian Habsburgs were the hereditary emperors of the Holy Roman Empire.  The Burgundian 
Provinces (the Netherlands) were acquired through the marriage of the Archduke Maximilian to the 
Duchess Mary of Burgundy, the daughter of Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy, on 18 August 1477.  
(Burgundy proper went to France’s Louis XII.)  Maximilian became Holy Roman Emperor in 1493 
after the death of his father Emperor Frederick III.  E.M. Lichnowsky, Geschichte des Hauses 
Habsburg,  (Vienna: Schaumsberg and Cie, 1836-1844), 8 vols., and Paula Fichtner, The Habsburg 
Monarchy, 1490-1848: Attributes of an Empire, (NewYork: Macmillan, 2003) 
11 See R. J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700: An Interpretation, (Oxford, 
UK: Clarendon Press, 1979); Jean Bérenger, Histoire de l’Empire des Habsbourg (A History of the 
Habsburg Empire), translated by C.A. Simpson, (London: Longman, 1994); Andrew Wheatcroft, The 
Habsburgs: Embodying Empire, (London: Penguin Books, 1995). 
12 J.H. Elliot, Imperial Spain, 1469-1716, (London: Penguin Books, 1963), 19-21. 
13 Charles inherited the traditional lands of the Holy Roman Empire including Germany, Austria-
Hungary, and the Netherlands as well as Spain and its numerous colonies.  Due to the problems of 
ruling this immense amount of land, when Charles decided to abdicate in 1556, the lands and Habsburg 
family were split into an Austrian branch and Spanish branch.  For more on this history, see 
Lichnowsky, Fichtner, and Bérenger, History of the Habsburg Empire. 
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fairly quiet province, to the customary rule of local assemblies.14  By the sixteenth 
century, the city of Antwerp in the northern portion of the Netherlands had become 
one of the most important trading centers in Europe.  With the influx of so many 
nationalities, Antwerp also became an intellectual capitol of Europe as the city 
remained open-minded and compromising in order to encourage trade.  Protestantism 
found a home in this environment.  During the Reformation that was sweeping 
through Europe during this period (the early 1500s), merchants were usually the first 
groups to embrace Protestantism as it offered them more of a reconciliation with the 
cut-throat practices of a mercantilistic life than did Catholicism—and Antwerp was 
flooded with merchants. 
When Philip II succeeded Charles in 1556, he found his rule unwelcome in the 
Netherlands.  Under a new king, the States-General decided to test their power and 
voice their discontent with their current situation.  In 1556, they and the Dutch 
nobility censured Spain’s war with France and in 1558, the State-General insisted on 
their right to be taxed only by “commissioners appointed by and responsible to the 
States.”15  Philip ignored these measures.  In addition to disregarding these political 
assertions of the Dutch assembly, Philip did not indulge the Protestant faith in his 
territories as his father had.  Upon the failure of his personal inquisition in the 
Netherlands in 1559, Philip reorganized the Church there and pushed Catholic 
                                                 
14 Richard Dunn, Age of Religious Wars, 1559-1715, (New York: Norton, 1979), 40-41.   
 
Charles had put down a revolt in Ghent in 1539, but the uprising did not affect the Netherlands outside 
of Ghent and Charles “crushed” it.  Charles Wilson, Transformation of Europe, 1558-1648, (Berkely: 
University of California Press, 1976), 138. 
 
For more on the governance of the Netherlands see also James Tracy, Holland under Habsburg Rule, 
1506-1566, (Oxford: University of California Press, 1990). 
15 Wilson, Transformation of Europe, 138. 
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absolutism.16  Almost instantly, Dutch Protestants began to organize against Philip 
and to solicit aid and support from Elizabeth, the strongest Protestant leader in 
Europe.  Elizabeth had reason to aid the Dutch not just because of some religious 
affinity, but also out of fear of growing Spanish power.  Philip reigned over a very 
rich empire that encompassed numerous colonies.  In 1559, as a condition of the 
Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis, which ended the long Italian Wars between France and 
Spain, Philip also married the Princess Elisabeth of Valois, the daughter of the French 
Catholic King Henri II.17  Now England faced a potential Catholic alliance consisting 
of Philip and his Inquisition and Henri II, who actively persecuted and executed 
Protestants.  Elizabeth had to begin assessing her resources and reevaluating her 
domestic and foreign policies based on these developments. 
In the Netherlands, the Catholic regent Margaret, half-sister to Philip II, made 
her dislike of Protestant England known.18  Hoping to strike at England economically, 
Margaret issued an embargo on all English trade in 1563.19  Margaret claimed that her 
actions were in response to English merchants’ protection of heretics and English acts 
of piracy in the Channel.20  But Philip, preoccupied with Turkish threats in the 
Mediterranean, and without ample evidence of such claims, ordered Margaret to lift 
                                                 
16 Hale, J.R., War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620, (London: Fontana, 1985), 18-19; 
Philip also sanctioned the Inquisition in Flanders again in 1570.  CSP Foreign, 1569-1571, no. 135. 
17 During his reign, from 1547-1559, Henri II actively persecuted Protestants for speaking their beliefs 
by imprisoning them for life, cutting out their tongues, or burning them at the stake. Henri received a 
mortal wound in a tournament to celebrate his daughter’s marriage to Philip II in 1559.  His son 
Francis II succeeded him.  Frederic Baumgarter, Henry II, King of France, 1547-1559, (Durham, NC: 
Duke University, 1998).   
18 Margaret of Parma was the illegitimate daughter of Charles V.  Charles acknowledged her in 1553, 
allowing her to take the Habsburg family name of “Margaret of Austria.”  She served as Regent of the 
Netherlands from 1559-1567.  In 1567 she resigned her post to the Duke of Alva on Philip’s orders.  
Alva was also put in charge of the Spanish militia in the Netherlands to quell the Dutch Revolt.  Felix 
Rachfahl, Margaretha von Parma, Statthalterin die Niederlande, 1559-1567, (München: Drud und 
Berlag von Oldenbourg, 1898). 
19 Ramsay, Queen’s Merchants,101. 
20 Susan Doran, Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy,1558-1603, (London: Routledge, 2000), 15. 
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the embargo “unconditionally” in 1565.21  Besides, the embargo had proved 
ineffective.  When Antwerp closed, English merchants found various other outlets for 
their merchandise and Antwerp actually suffered the loss of English trade more 
profoundly than did England.22   
English merchants established trade with countries like East Friesland, one of 
the few areas outside of Spain’s jurisdiction.  However, most of the expansion of 
English trade took merchants to the New World and to Africa—areas that Spain 
claimed rule over.  As early as the 1530s and 1540s Englishmen traded goods through 
Spain to America.  During these decades the practice of trading directly from England 
to Brazil also grew.  Iberian traders in England helped to establish direct English 
trade with Morocco as well.23   
Some merchants had even begun trading with Guinea in West Africa in the 
1550s, but Mary I had banned commercial voyages there in response to Philip’s 
numerous protests.24  On 27 October 1555, the council to the king wrote that the 
Portuguese ambassador complained often of English ships trading at Elmina in 
Guinea.  As the ambassador offered no direct proof as to the nationality of the ships, 
the council, “[thought] it fair nothing should be tried which is contrary to justice or 
impedes the amity which has long existed between this realm [England] and 
Portugal,” and did not advise the king to stop the trade.  If such trade was hindered, 
“it would injure the fortunes of many distinguished merchants of [Philip’s] city of 
                                                 
21 Doran, Elizabeth I and Foreign Policy, 15. 
22 Ramsay, Queen’s Merchants, 104. 
23 Andrews, Elizabeth Privateering, 11. 
24 C.S. Knighton, ed, Calendar of State Papers Domestic Series, Mary I, 1553-1558.  Preserved in the 
Public Record Office London.  (London: Antony Rowe, Ltd., 1998), 124, 141.  
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London.”25  This correspondence came as response to Philip’s agreement during the 
previous months to meet Portuguese objections to English designs on the Guinea 
trade. 26  By December, the situation had changed.  On 18 December 1555, the 
council wrote instead that: “after various consultations [they] thought good to signify 
to [Philip] that [the English merchants] should be ordered to refrain from departing, 
as was commanded in the names of your majesties at the start of last summer.”27  The  
council wrote further that: 
By command of the queen we discussed the case of Antonio Guarras, who 
sought licence to trade in this realm and pay the same tax as natives.  We 
noted that in the reigns of Henry VIII, and Edward VI and the queen such 
licenses were granted to various men, whereby your majesties’ taxes were 
diminished, and the merchants of this realm injured (of which many of them 
have complained).  We heard many in the last parliament complain of these 
and similar licences.  Therefore, to avoid many deceits always done under 
pretext of these licences, the queen, by our advise, desires that many of these 
licences be redeemed from those to whom they were granted for which the 
queen will pay large sum.28 
 
The king, with support of his English queen, had thus bound English subjects to the 
Treaty of Tordesillas. 
Elizabeth, however, felt no such obligation and paid little regard to the Treaty 
of Tordesillas of 1494 nor to the papal bulls surrounding the treaty that divided the 
New World between Spain and Portugal.29  Even more galling to Philip was the fact 
that Elizabeth’s refusal to police piracy against Spain in the colonies and throughout 
                                                 
25 Knighton, CSP, Domestic, Mary,  CSP 11/14, no. 4, 124. 
26 Horatio Brown and G. Cavendish Bentink, eds, Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series of the 
Reign of Elizabeth and Manuscripts Relating to English Affairs Existing in the Archives and 
Collections of Northern Italy, (London, 1864-1898), henceforth the CSP, Venetian, vi, 251.   
27 Knighton, CSP, Domestic, Mary, CSP 11/6, no. 78, 141. 
28 Knighton, CSP, Domestic, Mary, CSP 11/6, no. 78, 14. 
29 Pope Alexander VI supervised the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494 and Pope Julius II revised the 
treaty’s provisions in a papal bull of 1506.  See Paul Gottschalk, editor and translator, The Earliest 
Diplomatic Documents on America; the Papal Bulls of 1493 and the Treaty of Tordesillas, (Berlin: P. 
Gottschalk, 1927). For Julius II, see Christine Shaw, Julius II: The Warrior Pope, (Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell, 1993). 
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the Atlantic also directly challenged the authority he had claimed for himself (and the 
King of Portugal) in “all the territories in the Western ocean, island or mainland, 
discovered or undiscovered” in the Treaty of Crépy in 1544.30  On 29 January 1559, 
in discussing English negotiations with France,  Cecil related that: “as to the reports 
made by Spaniards concerning a treaty[Mary and Philip’s marriage treaty] whereby 
the realm of England rests bound to them, [Elizabeth] (thanked be to God) remain[ed] 
a free prince and owner of her crown and people.”31  Elizabeth further claimed that 
she would include the Spanish in English matters only in “matters expedient.”32  
English maritime expansion constituted such a matter, but Elizabeth felt the need to 
secure the right of expansion for her subjects (by denying the earlier treaties) before 
she opened any serious communication with Spain.  Philip’s ambassador in London 
wrote in 1558 that the King “deeply resented being interfered with” in his western 
“navigations.”33  This English incursion into Spanish trade routes by merchants and 
pirates exacerbated ever-deepening religious and political divisions straining the 
peace between Spain and England.  Spanish response to these actions and Elizabeth’s 
seeming refusal to intervene and discourage Englishmen from engaging in this trade 
led to unacknowledged open conflict on both sides that brought piracy and 
privateering to the forefront of Elizabeth’s many concerns. 
 
                                                 
30 Quoted in Herbert Richmond, The Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 1558-1727, (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University, 1953), 7. 
31 Reverend Joseph Stevenson, Calendar of State Papers, Foreign Series of the Reign of Elizabeth, 
1558-1559, (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1863), 107. 
32 Stevenson, CSP, Foreign, Elizabeth, 1558-1559, 107. 
33 As quoted in A.F. Pollard,.  The Political History of England: From the Ascension of Edward VI to 
the Death of Elizabeth, 1547-1603, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969), 305. 
 
  
Chapter 2: 
Rise of Piracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
A crucial element of the Netherlands conflict, exploits of English pirates and 
privateers during the 1560s and 1570s disrupted funds and goods sent to sustain 
Spanish forces.  Spanish funds and supplies to Catholic volunteers in England and 
Scotland were also disrupted.  These volunteers had been recruited to incite rebellion 
in Britain and aid in a possible invasion of the island.  There were numerous plots, 
real and imagined, to incite rebellion in England, Ireland, and/or Scotland during the 
period of Anglo-Spanish hostilities leading to the Armada in 1588 including the 
Rebellion of the Northern Earls in 1569.34   
Not only did English pirates and privateers hinder Philip’s ability to quickly 
put down the Dutch Revolt, but Elizabeth also unofficially aided the Protestant 
provinces in the Netherlands by sending men and money.  Dealing with the 
Netherlands in this way, Elizabeth not only hoped to thwart Spanish operations, but 
she also worked to disrupt Spanish communications with her already uneasy Catholic 
ally France (Treaty of Blois) who was undermining English authority in Scotland.  
Furthermore, this dealings helped to head off criticism of Elizabeth’s religious 
settlement and lack of enthusiasm for conflict with Catholicism from the “hotter” 
Protestants who were so eager in many cases for opportunities to privateer.  England 
desperately needed an ally and strove to avoid being neighbors with yet another 
Catholic power.35   
                                                 
34 Philip and his ambassadors were also implicated in practically every assassination plot against 
Elizabeth and bid for the English throne concerning Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots.  Anthony Fletcher, 
Tudor Rebellions, (Harlow, UK: Pearson, Longman, 2004), Fifth edition; Antonia Fraser, Mary Queen 
of Scots, (New York: Delacorte Press, 1969);  Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of Philip II, (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University, 1998). 
35 Elizabeth’s concern of “yet another Catholic power” was that France and Spain might unite with that 
power and invade England.  Whatever religion the Netherlands was to be, Elizabeth needed that 
country as a buffer. 
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Still, Elizabeth had to proceed carefully.  Keeping Spain distracted on the 
continent also allowed Elizabeth to expand her own power and influence, particularly 
commercially, in the confusion.  Since English efforts disrupted Spanish attempts to 
subdue the Dutch Revolt quickly, Philip had to concentrate on the Netherlands more 
than he had originally planned and more than he wanted to as he saw the possibility 
of war with England approaching by the 1570s.  His distraction hampered his ability 
to combat English privateers.  Once again, Elizabeth found a means to undermine 
Spanish power.  English interference in the Netherlands, by drawing Philip’s attention 
away from the “war” in the Atlantic, allowed for an expansion of English privateering 
efforts that helped England prepare for possible war.   
As many have pointed out, there were more issues contributing to war with 
Spain than just religion.  Piracy had been a problem for the English government for 
over a century and the nations of Europe had experienced much the same dilemma as 
the English of how to combat and curb the practice.  With the rise of commerce had 
come a rise in piracy.  The English Channel was a particular problem as ships of all 
nations came through the Channel to trade in Antwerp making the stretch of water 
particularly lucrative. 
Piracy was no “novel trade” for an English seaman and did not constitute an 
“original Protestant sin” which helped the practice’s popularity.36  Early in the 
fifteenth century, the Debate of Heralds, written by a Frenchman, disputed the 
English boast that they were “kings of sea,” saying that an Englishman’s only warfare 
was “plundering poor merchants who passed up and down the Channel.”37  Sixteenth-
                                                 
36 Pollard, Political History, 305. 
37 Quoted in Pollard, Political History, 305. 
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century Englishmen held the same beliefs as their forefathers.  Coupled with the 
Anglo-Spanish power struggle in the Netherlands, and as many pirates became 
privateers under Elizabeth, “piracy” took on a whole new significance in international 
policy.  As cases of piracy in international waters grew, the need increased for a court 
to address these grievances.  At this time, England had the only such established court 
to deal with these cases, but that Admiralty Court needed reform and instruction. 
The Admiralty Court of England was created in 1260 and covered all manner 
of maritime concerns from fishing rights to piracy.38  Theoretically, at the inception 
of the court, all maritime rights belonged to the Crown.  Every wreck, every piece of 
wreckage, and any fish or bird caught off the coast belonged to the king.  The king 
also held the responsibilities of regulating fishing, collecting port dues, and 
maintaining ports.39  By the sixteenth century, many of these rights had passed into 
the hands of private corporations and private individuals through grants, “actual or 
implied,” from the Crown.40  In fact, Edwin Welch stated that as the king’s authority 
passed into private hands, the royal powers over domestic maritime cases were also 
transferred.41  Most of this transference of power took place in the Middle Ages.  
Wherever sufficient need of a maritime court existed, that borough or district then 
applied for a “fee farm” from the Crown.  The subsequent “farming of royal 
revenues” meant that each borough then had royal courts within them.  Most of the 
boroughs applying for fee farms were coastal boroughs and the royal revenues they 
collected went to maintaining their ports and enforcing the king’s admiralty laws.  
                                                 
38 Evelyn Berckman, Victims of Piracy, (London: Hamilton, 1979), 5-8. 
39 Edwin Welch, ed, The Admiralty Court Book of Southampton, 1566-1585, (Southampton, UK: 
Southampton University, 1968), xi. 
40 Welch, Southampton, xi-xii. 
41 Welch, Southampton, xii. 
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The borough courts of admiralty grew out of the subsequent joining of maritime and 
other jurisdictions in these ports.42   
This handing over of rights to local parties often led to the corruption of the 
courts of admiralty.  The courts maintained sole jurisdiction in their county and were 
the ultimate authority since the king had transferred his maritime rights.  Without fear 
of repercussion local officials began cooperating with those seamen and merchants 
who operated in their jurisdiction.  Some corruption was expected as officials went 
unpaid.  As evidence of this corruption, in 1578, for example, even though officials of 
the Admiralty Court brought some 900 pirates to trial, only three of those convicted 
faced the gallows.  The other 897 either received pardons from local officials who 
were likely the pirates’ business partners, or they simply bribed the officials 
outright.43  The vice-admirals were expected to make a profit out of fees and 
requisitions but bribes remained far more profitable and as counties were practically 
autonomous in maritime matters, under-the-table deals were common.  For this 
reason, throughout the sixteenth century, “the admiralty was looked upon mainly as a 
source of profit,” not as an instrument for enforcing law.44   
With the door open to agreements for exchange of goods or percentages of 
shipments, officials often applied the same practices to their dealings with pirates in 
their ports in exchange for non-prosecution.  In 1536, Henry VIII passed the first Act 
of Piracy in an attempt to regain control of the coast.  The act created the position of 
the “Vice-Admiral of the Coast” who was to “proceed in matters of 
                                                 
42 Welch, Southampton, xii. 
43 Sir Sherston Baker, The Office of the Vice-Admiral of the Coast: Being Some Account of That 
Ancient Office, (London: Privately Printed, 1884). 
44 R.C. Marsden,  “The Vice-Admirals of the Coast,” English Historical Review., (1907), xxii. 
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piracy…according to the order of the laws.”45  During the same year, Henry added 
statute laws and courts to eliminate the “complications and contradictions” of the 
existing civil and common law.46  Dissatisfied with the way in which his officials 
dealt with “Traytors, Pirates, Thieves, Murtheres and Confederates upon the Sea,” 
Henry and his Parliament passed an act claiming that in the future all such offences 
were to be tried by new commissioners appointed by the Crown.47  These new offices 
included that of Lord High Admiral, his lieutenant or deputy, and three of four other 
“substantial persons.”48  Much still depended on the integrity of the office holders, 
and Henry’s his first appointees were little more than pirates themselves.  
By Elizabeth’s time, this situation had changed little.  In fact, a majority of 
local Admiralty court officials and justices were not only easily bribed, but were often 
involved in pirate ventures themselves through personal connections and even direct 
investment. 49  If the government could not even control their appointed officials, it 
certainly could not expect to control pirates darting in and out of coastal cities.  
Facing little to no consequence for their actions, and as trade continued to expand, 
pirates branched out of local waters and tried their hands at international piracy.  
Henry’s desire to regulate and reorganize the courts was, in this case, as with so many 
others during his reign, hampered by his constant need to raise revenue and create 
support for his extremely controversial reign.  Offices created by administrative and 
legal reforms often wound up in the hand of the wealthy and powerful.  The office of 
the Lord High Admiral was no exception.  Eight Lord High Admirals served under 
                                                 
45 Quoted in Gosse, History of Piracy, 315 
46 Welch, Southampton, xiii.  
47 Welch, Southampton, xiii. 
48 Welch, Southampton, xiii..  (Act 28 Henry VIII, c. 15) 
49 Gosse, History of Piracy, 315. 
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Henry, only three of whose careers lasted ten years or longer.50  By 1563, over 400 
known pirates operated in the four seas around England.51  Laws were difficult to 
enforce and the profits of piracy far outweighed the cost of business such as the 
paying of bribes to local officials for pardons and to ignore certain comings and 
goings.  This is the situation that Elizabeth found herself facing in the 1560s.   
When Elizabeth gained the throne, Edward Clinton held the position of Lord 
High Admiral.  Clinton had previously served as Lord High Admiral from 1550-1554 
during the end of Edward VI’s reign and beginning of Mary I’s reign.52  Having 
supported Northumberland in his attempts to bar Mary from the succession, Clinton 
lost his position, but over the next four years, worked his way back into the 
monarch’s good graces.  Philip actually campaigned for Clinton’s reappointment as 
Lord High Admiral in 1558 and appointment to Mary’s Privy Council, although 
Clinton was, as the Spanish ambassador Count de Feria wrote to Philip, “a double-
dealer and principally concerned with his own interests.”53  This double-dealing 
helped Clinton transition into the government of Elizabeth just as it had helped him 
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under Mary.  Clinton’s willingness to stay in the good graces of the monarch made 
him a useful Lord High Admiral for Elizabeth. 
At the start of Elizabeth’s reign, the English navy suffered from a lack of 
ships.  Henry VIII had spent much revenue in building a navy.  Whereas in 1509, 
Henry had only five ships in royal service, he built a remarkable forty seven between 
1509 and 1547.  During that same period, he acquired thirty-five more by purchase 
and capture.54  Not all of these vessels remained in the king’s service as evidence by 
the fact that in 1547, when Edward VI came to the throne, the royal navy consisted of 
thirty ships over 300 tons each, fifteen twenty-ton boats, and numerous smaller 
craft.55  Edward and his successor Mary found themselves too concerned with other 
matters of state to continue Henry’s plans for the English navy and, by 1558, as 
Elizabeth began her regency, the navy consisted of only twenty-one of the original 
300 ton ships, not all of which held active commissions, and six smaller vessels.56  As 
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Elizabeth tried to assign funds to rebuild and repair her fleet, she also had to 
overcome the over £7000 debt to the Admiralty still lingering from the reign of Mary 
I.57  Rather than simply raising taxes to pay for her needed expenditures, Elizabeth 
frequently hired out her ships to private adventurers for trading, exploring, or 
privateering enterprises.58  She had inherited what no other sovereign in the world 
possessed—a fleet with a permanent organization to maintain and administer it.  
However, the rampant corruption in that organization and the chaos left from the 
preceding reign, kept Elizabeth struggling just to keep England on its feet financially, 
leaving her little resources for the Navy.59  Therefore, the defense of England relied 
largely on ships that might be supplemented in an emergency from the merchant 
marine and private owners.60  The innovation in this practice under Elizabeth rested in 
the fact that even though she employed her own shipwrights, the sailors who hired her 
ships were also expected to repair and outfit the ship as they saw fit.  The opportunity 
to use royal ships to stiffen privateering ventures encouraged the practice of 
privateering.  In this way, Elizabeth moved towards the notion of a self-financing 
navy since Parliament’s intractability in granting taxes had forced her to seek other 
means of revenue. 
Aside from a lack of adequate ships, the English navy also suffered from 
shortages of men and resources.  Under Edward VI, 7,731 soldiers and mariners 
served England.  Twenty years into Elizabeth’s reign, only 3,760 seamen and 1,900 
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soldiers served the state.61  This decrease in manpower grew out of Elizabeth’s choice 
not to finance an unofficial navy and also, in large part, due to the attractions of 
piracy.  The lure of prizes and large profits tempted many captains to commandeer 
their English ships and turn to a life of raiding.  Life as a pirate was quite often 
preferable to life as a sailor in the Royal Navy in the mid-sixteenth century.  Sailors 
were impressed into both professions on many occasions, but at least as pirates they 
earned a share of the ship’s profits.  Discipline was also less severe on board pirate 
ships.  Pirate crews had captains but each man depended upon every one of his 
comrades in their missions to plunder and avoid capture.  Therefore, captains could 
not impose severe punishment on their crews if they did not want those men reporting 
to the authorities or mutinying.62  Unlike Spain and Portugal, who, according to 
Richard Hakluyt, “had full employment for their sailors and [therefore] bred no 
pirates,” England did not offer her seamen steady professions as naval officers before 
the mid-sixteenth century.63  Even though Elizabeth had issued a handful of reprisal 
letters in 1562 encouraging privateers to include Spain among their targets, the 
practice did not become a commonplace occurrence in the 1560s. 
Due to the weakness of England’s naval forces, the state could not effectively 
patrol the English coast.  In the absence of authority, the English coast quickly grew 
in popularity as a haven for pirates.  Englishmen constituted the majority of the 
pirates operating in the English Channel and North Atlantic and often used English 
ports as bases of operation (usually their hometowns), finding aid and support from 
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friends serving as local port officials.64  In 1564, Elizabeth, for example, issued “an 
open letter” to “all Mayors, Sheriffs, Justices of Peace, etc, to aide and assist to the 
best of their powers the Mayor, Aldermen and certain citizens of Bristow to whom a 
Commission is awarded out of the Court of Admiralty to furnish and set to the seas 
certain ships for the repressing and apprehending of pirates haunting the seas between 
Silley and the port of Bristow.”65   Following this action, in 1565, for the first time 
Elizabeth appointed special commissions in every coastal county to “discover cases 
of piracy, and to report on receivers of plunder and identify all aiders and abettors, 
not least [of all] those selling rovers essential supplies.” 66  This Privy Council act 
outlined in detail the duties of port officials and the offenses they were to prosecute.  
The act also stated that officials must report to the queen and Privy Council once a 
month with their findings.67  But much the same as before, these commissions had 
very little initial effect as numerous “aiders and abettors” still served as town 
officials, justices of the peace, and local officials of the Admiralty Court that had 
escaped punishment for decades and were still just as reluctant as they had been under 
Henry to turn in those making them great profits.   
Admiralty law and its enforcers seemed indifferent to this despite the 
changing letter of the law under Elizabeth.  The threat of more stringent prosecution 
for such offences did not encourage adherence to the law.  However, as the number of 
reprisal letters and commissions increased in the late 1560s, Admiralty Court officials 
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were no longer in charge of seamen’s fates.  Men with letters did not have to bribe 
local officials and, since their actions were no longer illegal.  The number of “aiders 
and abettors” decreased slightly simply from the change in legal language and 
punishment, but mostly from the decrease in the incidency of “piracy” due to 
Elizabeth’s encouragement of privateering. 
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The effectiveness of Elizabeth’s privateering policies rested on her ability to 
establish her authority over her subjects.  Therefore, on 11 December 1558, barely a 
month after coming to the throne, Elizabeth issued a general proclamation addressing 
the issues of reprisal letters under Mary I and piracy within the realm.  Elizabeth had 
to make privateers from Mary’s reign beholden to the new queen.  Mary had been 
very strict on piracy in the last few years of her reign.  This interest of the queen came 
more from her husband then herself.  Philip and Spain had many more ships at sea 
than England and had little physical protection.  Stringent piracy laws and effective 
enforcement of those laws meant a great deal to a man looking to protect his treasure-
laden fleets.  Elizabeth, however, would change these practices. 
Mary’s marriage to Philip had been unpopular in England.  Aside from 
religious unease, the Spanish connection had brought England into the Franco-
Spanish conflict.  Though the marriage treaty had stated that “England shall not be 
entangled with the war between the emperor [Charles V] and the French king,” Mary 
did indeed join the fray.  England and France had long been enemies and Mary was 
eager to please her husband. The marriage treaty stipulated that: “Philip, as much as 
he can, shall see peace observed between France and England, and give no cause of 
breach, but may assist in defense of his lands and revenge of his injuries.”68  On this 
last statement came the justification for English involvement.  In June and September 
of 1556, the council to the king, and the king writing to Mary from Ghent addressed 
the presence of and attacks by pirates.  Mary had immediately sent out ships against 
the pirates.69  This action began English intervention for the Spanish cause.  On 9 
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June 1557, Mary and Philip issued a proclamation licensing privateers.70  The 
proclamation allowed subjects to: “equip ships at their own charges for the annoyance 
of the French…without penalty.”71  Despite this licensure and its proposed purpose, 
the ships were not to be armed, nor munition taken from any ship.72  This 
proclamation was very specific and followed her earlier appeasement of Philip’s 
entreaties for the discontinuation of English attacks on his ships and their disruption 
of Spanish trade.73   Mary still remained more concerned with religious affairs in 
England than any other matter. 
However, Elizabeth made a point to claim that any of these acts and letters 
issued under Mary “[were] by reason of the said Queen’s highness death determined, 
and of no force.”74  However, those men who, “going unto the seas…by color or 
pretence to repress, apprehend, and annoy [ships] without regard of duties belonging 
to good subjects [and] have invaded, spoiled, injured and robbed…her Highness’ 
subjects [as well as her] friends and [those] allied to her Majesty” will find 
themselves subject to “confiscation and forfeiture of their ships and goods, and of 
imprisonment of their bodies” should they continue in their practices.75  Any mission, 
whether “on warfare, merchandise, or otherwise,” required licenses from the high 
court of Admiralty.76  Finally, the proclamation ended with an entreaty to all officers 
to comply or “every of them will answer for the contrary at his extreme peril.”77  This 
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proclamation did not specifically address pirates though it can certainly be inferred 
that they were the main target of this legislation.  Even so, the avoidance of the term 
was obviously deliberate.  By not labeling the men addressed here as “pirates,” 
Elizabeth gave them the benefit of the doubt.  Her claim to the throne was unpopular 
enough without her attacking an influential group of her subjects by suddenly 
disallowing them a trade they had indulged in for years and attacking them with the 
connotation-laden term of “pirate” (though pirates were exactly what most of them 
were).  It is also important to note that this proclamation did not proscribe any severe 
punishments for the offense of sailing without a proper license.  The worst penalty 
was imprisonment as men could replace ships and thereby retrieve more goods.  
Additionally, this proclamation did not declare that men could not receive licenses 
anymore, but rather they simply had to bring their old letters to the Admiralty Court 
and receive new letters under Elizabeth’s seal.  By offering only mild punishments for 
crimes of piracy, this proclamation did not greatly discourage the practice—it only 
altered the target.  Elizabeth was not beholden to Philip and Spain as Mary had been 
and therefore she did not specifically restrict reprisals against Spanish shipping.  
More importantly, Elizabeth used this proclamation as an assertion of her own royal 
authority in reversing Mary’s policies.78 
Two years later, in 1560, Elizabeth issued a proclamation meant to begin the 
process of controlling the practice of piracy.  Numerous Spanish complaints flooded 
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the English courts and Privy Council and Elizabeth had to answer them.79  In the 
same vein as her 1558 proclamation, this proclamation remained moderate in 
treatment and language towards pirates by offering clemency to those willing to come 
forward.  On report from “some of the subjects of her good brother the king of 
Spain,” Elizabeth acknowledged the large number of pirates operating along her 
shores despite “the severity of Justice” her Majesty’s courts prescribed for the 
offences.80  This wording is again important.  As mentioned earlier, Elizabeth’s 1558 
proclamation had provided for only mild punishments of pirates.  But, Elizabeth 
chose to claim that she had in fact meted out severe penalties for piracy.  Whether the 
Spanish believed these punishments were indeed severe is another story, did respond 
to Spanish complaints.  In the 1560 proclamation she reiterated the invalidity of 
“certain old letters of reprisals” issued before 1558.81  This proclamation further 
stated that: 
Before her Majesty will extend her force of arms or Justice against any of 
these sundry Pirates, her Majestie warneth them all to return with speed, either 
to their dwelling places, or to the next port that they may attain unto after the 
notice hereof, and there to geve knowledge of their names and dwelling 
places, and of all their enterprises done either by themselves, or by such in 
whole company they were, while they were upon the Seas.82 
 
If they did so, they would receive pardons from Admiralty Court proceedings they 
would have faced if captured by the Queen’s ships.83  Once again, in closing, the 
Queen charged her officers to “have a diligent and carefull eye” for any such piratical 
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offences “as [officials] will answer for the contrary at their utmost peril.”84  Elizabeth 
acknowledged Spanish complaints and made political overtures to address the subject 
of those grievances, but the 1560 proclamation was even less threatening than that of 
1558.  Before issuing any more “severe” punishments for piracy, Elizabeth first gave 
all pirates an opportunity to turn themselves in and legalize their exploits.  
Submission to Elizabeth’s royal authority was emphasized over actual punishment.  
With this legislation Elizabeth also began to draw the thin line between pirates and 
privateers. 
As in the previous document, Elizabeth remained very conciliatory towards 
pirates in her realm.  She offered them a way to escape prosecution simply by 
returning to port and admitting their transgressions.  Records of identified pirates 
could also serve as a pool of potentially useful privateers in the future.  If pirates did 
as suggested, “her Majesty [would be] content to show favor and mercy” to them.85  
Should they not take this opportunity, they would be suffer “extreme punishments as 
they [had] deserved, to the example of all others” though none of these “extreme 
punishments” were specified.86  Matters of religion within England, especially during 
the first years of Elizabeth’s reign, often overshadowed any of these proclamations on 
piracy and Admiralty Court issues and thereby also overshadowed any efforts to 
enforce such legislation.  This is part of the reason behind the language of the 
documents.  Elizabeth did not have the time and resources to effectively deal with 
these problems and hoped that by enticing pirates to gain new letters and turn in other 
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pirates with the promise of pardon for their own actions that she might be able to 
remedy the problem to some extent.   
Another reason for the lack of enforcement in these cases lay simply in the 
fact that Elizabeth realized that damage done to a powerful but potentially 
antagonistic country like Spain was not all bad.  Should England and Spain become 
full-blown enemies, the damage done to Spanish shipping by pirates would work to 
England’s advantage.  There was little reason for Elizabeth to alienate a part of her 
population that she could use quite productively should diplomatic measures with 
Spain fail.  Furthermore, as Elizabeth had decided against building a Royal Navy, she 
realized that she may need these men and their ships in the future.  Therefore, she 
certainly did not want to imprison or execute them unless she absolutely had to.  
Besides, if these pirates confined themselves to piracy only against foreign countries, 
England could benefit from the revenue from their exploits.  At the least, her subjects, 
and the Spanish ambassadors, could not complain that she did make any efforts to act 
on their complaints.  This practice of appeasement would continue to help Elizabeth 
on an even larger scale in the coming years. 
A number of Spaniards also found themselves subject to these laws.  On 25 
February 1563, special commissioners of the Admiralty Court heard a number of 
complaints from Spanish subjects seeking return of goods and reprisal for spoiled 
goods and ships.87  The English Court ruled that the Spanish had seized other goods 
“contrary to [the Queen’s] proclamation” and they therefore forfeited their goods 
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stated in this particular case.88  Such proceedings did not satisfy Spain and in 1564, 
Philip sent an ambassador to propose a conference at Bruges to discuss maritime 
jurisdiction.  Philip objected to the English “constituting themselves judges of the 
seas as the high seas were common property.”89  Interestingly, a decade prior, when 
the Spanish had quarreled with the French over a similar situation, the Admiralty 
Court had been proposed as “a suitable tribunal” to try the case as England possessed 
the only maritime court system in Europe.90  This case referred to occurred in 1554.  
In that year, a French man-of-war captured a Venetian ships bound for Antwerp.  At 
this time Spain, under Charles V, was at war with France.   Venice was not part of 
Charles’ Italian holdings but the French still captured the ship on the grounds that it 
carried vital supplies to Spanish assemblies in the Netherlands.  After the French had 
taken the ship, Dutch pirates then captured the French.   The Spanish and French 
appealed to the English courts as to the Dutch’s legal claim to the goods.  The courts 
ruled that the Venetian ship was never lawful prize to the French, therefore the Dutch 
could not retain it.  Venice recovered its goods. 91   This case served to legitimize 
English maritime courts’ authority yet again.  Philip’s father had recognized English 
maritime jurisdiction once and the English continued to argue that they had precedent 
for such claim since they had held such jurisdiction since the reign of Henry VIII.  
Under Henry, English jurisdiction generally only included the waters immediately 
surrounding England but with this particular 1544 case, the courts’ rule expanded and 
supported the Elizabethan argument for maritime jurisdiction.   
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The Elizabethan Admiralty Court had grown substantially since that time and 
with the expansion of English maritime endeavors into the Atlantic, New World, and 
to the Indies, English courts saw it as only natural to extend their jurisdiction to all 
maritime affairs affecting English property and subjects.  Philip saw this as an 
audacious and illegal move on the part of the courts and Spain’s relationship with 
England greatly changed in the course of the decade.  Mary no longer sat on the 
English throne and Philip could not expect a favorable judgment from the court now.  
Legally, however, Philip had no other recourse but to officially accept the English 
court’s decision as he tried to hold on to some semblance of amity with England. 
 Rising tensions with the Spanish contributed to the issuance of yet another 
piracy proclamation on 31 July 1564.  The opening of this proclamation asserted the 
Queen’s “good and perfect peace with all Princes and Countreys” and her desire 
“with the assistaunce of almighty God, to continue in the same.”92  Specifically 
addressing the Spanish situation of the previous year, Elizabeth commanded that “all 
manner of ships and vessels armed for war…shall with all speed return from the Seas 
and unarm themselves.”93  The English claimed the right to seize ships that came into 
English ports or threatened the Channel with guns unless they had “already given 
good and sufficient surety not to offend any of the Subjects of the Kings and Princes 
with whom her Majesty [was] in amity.”94  Again, the language of this proclamation 
is extremely important especially considering the rising tensions in the Netherlands.  
This proclamation would be crucial to English maritime policy in a few very short 
years from its publication.  In asserting the English right and practice of protecting 
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not just English subjects, but all of the subjects of England’s allies from attack and 
spoil at sea, Elizabeth claimed the right to protect shipping and prevent threats upon 
the Netherlands as the Dutch were subjects of the Spanish king.  Elizabeth and her 
“good brother” Philip claimed alliance and Philip had no grounds to argue against this 
legislation.  After all, Elizabeth claimed she was protecting his subjects. 
 Though Philip could not argue with the first part of Elizabeth’s 1564 
proclamation, he no doubt had concerns about the second assertion of the Queen.  
Whereas the Queen maintained that no ships in the Channel should carry arms, she 
gave allowance to English ships to arm themselves if necessary, as long as their 
captains obtained permission from the Crown, and promised to keep the “common 
peace.”95  Elizabeth therefore asserted that only English ships had license to arms 
themselves.  If only English ships were armed they would certainly control the 
Channel.  Needless to say, this portion of her proclamation did little to curb piracy.  
First, other nations’ ships paid little heed to the Queen’s statements as they did not 
recognize her authority.  By offering Englishmen the opportunity of obtaining license 
to arm themselves on top of the licenses for reprisal she afforded them in previous 
declarations, Elizabeth laid the foundation for privateering.  Still, Elizabeth did not 
openly encourage privateering.  In 1565, the special commissions she established to 
“discover cases of piracy” did little to pirates but again showed her willingness to 
address foreign grievances by taking more steps towards curbing piracy.96   
Events in the Spanish Caribbean in 1568 changed the nature and importance 
of Elizabeth’s earlier proclamations concerning piracy.  Due to the activity of English 
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pirates, Spain had lost numerous shipments of gold and silver from their colonies 
meant to finance Spanish efforts in subduing the Dutch.97  England and Spain had 
debated nations’ rights to trade for years.  Elizabeth had never accepted Spanish 
sovereignty on the seas and had in fact asserted sovereignty over the Channel.   The 
English argued that the seas were free and Englishmen had the right to trade “where 
there was water to float [their] ships” while the Spanish continued to cite centuries-
old papal bulls, royal proclamations, and the theory of occupation to affirm their sole 
right to trade with their possessions overseas.98  In 1561, Philip’s ambassador 
informed him that Cecil, Elizabeth’s secretary, had claimed that “The Pope had no 
right to partition the world and to give and take kingdoms to whomever he pleased.”99   
This statement again expressed English disregard of Spanish claims when it came to 
trade for as the ambassador also wrote Philip: “Nothing will bring these people to 
their senses.  They claim to have a right to go to all lands or provinces belonging to 
friendly states without exception.”100   
The English had already answered Portuguese ambassadors who complained 
about Englishmen trading along the coast of Africa with the argument that only 
effective occupation meant the English could not trade in a particular place.  So long 
as English traders stayed away from forts and traded with independent parties, they 
could go wherever they pleased.101  Such beliefs underpinned Admiralty Court 
decisions as evidenced earlier.  Since the English Admiralty Court handled practically 
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all complaints of piracy and reprisal, they more often than not found for their 
countrymen.  Spaniards constantly found themselves on the losing end of these 
decisions.  Philip could not ignore the partiality of the English courts.  Additionally, 
as the Admiralty Court had grown under Elizabeth, it extended its jurisdiction to 
include the expanding areas of English trade in the Atlantic, the New World, and the 
Indies.  This gave English pirates the opportunity to broaden their operations and 
attack every avenue of Spanish trade.  Facing bankruptcy because of English pirates 
on top of the enormous expenses to maintain his large empire, Philip constantly 
complained to Elizabeth and demanded her intervention in the matter.  The Queen 
offered him only lip service and ambiguous proclamations and commissions. 
Annoyed that Elizabeth did little to stop English pirates, in September 1568, 
Philip approved an attack on an English fleet led by John Hawkins in the port of San 
Juan de Ulúa, the entrance to the harbor at Vera Cruz in New Spain.102  Hawkins’ 
fleet had come to the New World to sell slaves acquired from the African coast—a 
trade Philip had explicitly denied to Englishmen based on the Treaties of Tordesillas 
and Crépy.103  Elizabeth paid little heed to Philip’s declarations and did not 
discourage individuals from pursuing various trade missions.  She even lent Hawkins 
two 700 ton ships to undertake the voyage.104  With royal ships as escorts, such 
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voyages lost their peaceful appearance and by setting out armed seemed almost 
“designed to fight.”105  Hawkins voyage in 1568 was one such expedition.  Elizabeth 
could continue to turn a blind eye to the attacks and skirmishes that always seemed to 
accompany Hawkins’s ventures (and others like him), but she knew well enough what 
these privateers did while on the seas. 
Before Hawkins had left Plymouth Sound in England to begin his voyage to 
the Indies, several Spanish warships had approached the harbor while his crew 
prepared for their journey.106  As the fleet lay in harbor, seven Spanish warships 
entered the sound.  Already on guard as he was aware of de Silva’s suspicions of him 
and the international complications brought about by his voyages, Hawkins observed 
the warships closely and told his own ships and crew to make ready in case of a fight.  
Custom dictated that ships should lower their flags when approaching an ally’s fleet 
as a mark of respect but the Spanish ships, due to their own arrogance (according to 
English sources) towards the Englishmen and in defiance of English expectations, did 
not strike their flags in the presence of Hawkins’ fleet.107  Rather than arrogance, the 
Spanish ships’ actions were conceivably meant to be a provocation.  They wanted the 
English to fire first.   
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Either way, taking the action as an insult, Hawkins ordered his men to fire 
upon the “insolent flag” until the Spanish finally struck their flags.108  After putting in 
to anchor, the commander of the Spanish ships, the Flemish Admiral Baron de 
Wachen, sent emissaries to Hawkins conveying Wachen’s “great surprise at being 
fired upon in a friendly port.”109  Ever the politician, Hawkins replied that “great as 
[is] the friendship between [Englishmen] and the subjects of King Philip,” any who 
entered an English port must obey the known rules and authorities.110  Stating his 
position as commander of the Queen’s ships, Hawkins claimed that he had simply 
done his duty in enforcing such obedience.111  Hawkins also declared that he “had 
rather Her Highness found fault with me for keeping her ships and people to her 
honour, than to lose them to the glory of others.”112  In light of this earlier incident, 
Hawkins was certainly worried about the consequences of docking his ships in San 
Juan.  Elizabeth had reprimanded him for his actions at Plymouth and instructed him 
to change his behavior if he found himself in such a position again.  Hawkins did find 
himself in such a position again at San Juan with his hands tied by the Queen’s 
reaction to Plymouth.113   
On 16 September, Hawkins made his way to San Juan and immediately 
dispatched a letter to the governor of Vera Cruz explaining his situation: 
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I have touched in your island only to the intent to refresh my men with fresh 
victuals, which for my money or my wares you shall sell me, meaning to stay 
only 5 or 6 days here at the furthest.  In the which time you may assure 
yourself, and so all other, that by me or by any of mine there shall no damage 
be done to any man; the which also the Queen’s Majesty of England, my 
mistress, at my departure out of England commanded me to have great care 
of, and to serve with my navy the King’s Majesty of Spain, my old master, if 
in places where I came any of his stood need. 114 
 
By making the decision to come to terms with the governor rather than destroy the 
Spanish fleet on sight, Hawkins made the distinction “between compulsory trade and 
flagrant piracy.”115  At the least, he obeyed his queen and avoided another act of war.  
The English certainly put it to good use alongside their arguments for the right to 
trade on any sea.  Of course, the Spanish saw things quite differently.  No matter how 
friendly or innocuous Hawkins claimed his intentions to be, tensions still ran very 
high between the two parties.  How could the Spanish allow this pirate and enemy of 
Spain to receive safe harbor?  Yet, how could they justify attacking him after his 
request for a truce when the two sides were not technically at war?116  Certainly the 
incident at Plymouth was in their minds.   
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The next morning, a Spanish merchant fleet from Seville escorted by two 
warships arrived at the mouth of the harbor.  Hawkins sent immediately to the general 
of the fleet that: “Before [Hawkins] would suffer [the Spanish fleet] to enter the port, 
there should be some order of Conditions passed between us, for [the English fleet’s] 
safe being there, and maintenance of peace.”117  The urgency of Hawkins’ attempts 
for an agreement with the government was heightened by this Spanish presence.  
Finally, after three days of negotiations with the new Viceroy of New Spain, Don 
Martin Enriquez, Hawkins received permission to complete his repairs and leave.  In 
exchange, he allowed the Spanish ships to enter their harbor.118  After three days, 
Hawkins and the Viceroy reached an agreement including the exchange of ten 
hostages.  “Forthwith a trumpet was blown” to signify the conclusion of the truce 
talks and each side saluted one another “as the manner of the sea [required].”119  
However, by 23 September, Hawkins noticed that the Spanish had cut new ports in 
the sides of the largest merchant ship.120  This served as proof of the “accustomed 
treason” of the Spanish that Hawkins had feared.121  Robert Barrett, the master of 
Hawkins’ flagship was sent to complain about these actions by the Spanish and, on 
his second trip to protest the activities of the Spanish, Enriquez arrested Barrett and 
gave the order for attack.122  Both sides suffered extensive damage and lost ships.  
The Spanish killed several Englishmen in the town, men were lost on both sides 
during the sea fight, Hawkins sank one Spanish ship-of-war and burned two others, 
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and the Spanish destroyed Hawkins’ flagship—the Queen’s ship—the Jesus of 
Lübeck.123  Francis Drake, Hawkins’ cousin and second in command, managed to 
make his way back to England on 20 January 1569.  Hawkins arrived at Plymouth on 
15 January 1569 and reached London on 4 February 1569.124 
These attacks on Hawkins’ fleet enraged English sailors and many of 
Elizabeth’s councilors.  The “hotter” Protestants of England saw this act by the 
Spanish as a declaration of war and justification for a crusade against the Spanish.  
But cooler heads prevailed and Elizabeth was able to avoid an open declaration of 
war.  She sent letters to Philip expressing her regret for this incident.125  Philip 
accepted her overtures of peace partly because he recognized that his agents’ held 
some guilt in the matter, partly because he found himself consumed with other 
pressing matters in the Netherlands and in the Eastern Mediterranean, and he feared 
an unchecked full-scale privateering campaign.  One less enemy was readily 
welcome.  Still, all the while she offered peace, Elizabeth encouraged English 
merchants to remain involved in African and New World trade and began issuing the 
first privateering commissions against Spain.   
The “troublesome voyage” of Hawkins ended all hopes of recognized English 
trade in the Indies.  Williamson argues that it also ended any shred of alliance and 
amity between England and Spain.126  It was an important turning point in Anglo-
Spanish relations as the English never forgave the “treachery of San Juan,” but the 
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issuing of commissions in and of themselves did the most to strain Anglo-Spanish 
relations.  Letters of reprisal against Spanish ships had been issued for decades.  
Evidence for the issuance of a reprisal letters had to be brought before the Admiralty 
Court and such letters could only be issued for the amount of goods lost.  The new 
letters of marque and commissions that Elizabeth now issued contained no such 
limitations.  Hawkins’ voyage and diplomatic entanglements and distrust that 
followed it helped to spur this practice.  It can be easily argued that after 1568-1569 a 
state of war existed between the two powers despite the continued diplomatic and 
political maneuverings of both sides in the 1570s.  Spanish actions in San Juan 
created a privateering fervor in England and Elizabeth obliged eager captains with 
licenses.  She even invested in a number of expeditions herself.127 
In the midst of this fervor, in November 1568, Spanish ships carrying bullion 
supposedly amounting to upwards up £150,000 to pay troops under the Duke of Alva 
in the Netherlands took shelter from bad weather in the Channel in English ports.128  
English authorities, eager to seize this opportunity, and in full knowledge of the fact 
that Spain had borrowed the money from Genoese bankers, instantly raised questions 
about the ownership of the bullion.  Legally, the money belonged to the Genoese still 
as the loan did not become effective until the money reached Antwerp.129  The 
English exploited this technical loophole.  As a “precaution against theft,” English 
authorities had the treasure unloaded.130  Don Gerau de Spes, the Spanish ambassador 
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in London, believed that Elizabeth had confiscated the treasure for the express 
purpose of damaging Spanish efforts in the Netherlands.131  De Spes was likely 
correct in this assumption but the seizure of the Spanish bullion was also in response 
to the recent attack at San Juan and the gold became a hostage for reparations.   
On 3 December 1568, Hawkins brother William had written to Secretary 
William Cecil claiming that he had received news of the destruction of his brother’s 
fleet in the Indies.132  William Hawkins pushed for a “stay [to be] made of King 
Phillip’s treasure…in these parts, till there be sufficient recompense made for the 
great wrong offered, and also other wrongs done before this.”133  Elizabeth and Cecil 
had no official news of Hawkins’ defeat, therefore, they could not assert rights to the 
Spanish treasure based on reprisal for that mission.  Legally, they already had a good 
defense for their seizure of the Spanish bullion.  De Spes, however, frustrated that he 
could not prove his initial beliefs that Queen had acted on hearsay accounts of San 
Juan and scoffing at the English courts’ assertions of a need to protect the treasure 
from pirates, reacted forcefully in December when he convinced Alva to confiscate 
English ships and property in the Netherlands as means of reprisal.134  Existing 
treaties stated that an arrest of English goods was lawful only after a formal complaint 
of grievance and denial of redress.135  The Spanish carried out no such process before 
confiscating English goods.  For this reason, Elizabeth could technically claim “a 
breach of treaty and unwarranted aggression” which gave her justification for seizing 
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Spanish goods in England and placing de Spes under house arrest for his part in the 
affair.136  Since Brussels consorted with the Spanish in this matter, Elizabeth had the 
right to seize their goods abroad as well.137  This entire situation was a crucial 
breaking point in Anglo-Spanish relations putting the nations on the brink of war.  
Legal maneuvering and written correspondence had thus far helped to delay any open 
aggression but now, with the physical responses of both nations in seizing one 
another’s ships coupled with the events at San Juan, the possibility of war drew closer 
than ever.  
On 6 January 1569, all trade was suspended between England and the 
countries ruled by Spain.138  Elizabeth’s proclamation referred to “circumstances 
relating to the arrest of her subjects, and their goods in the Low countries” and 
protested that their seizure “was done in retaliation of the stay of certain Spanish 
ships and money [and] was not correct.”139  The proclamation further claimed that 
“the said [Spanish] vessels were protected from the French.”140  Asserting her 
authority, Elizabeth also stated that: “by all lawful custom and usage she had a right 
to borrow the said money, it being the property of private merchants, and being saved 
from the perils of the sea on her territory.”141  Though this action may seem defensive 
on the part of Elizabeth, it was arguably her first offensive move towards official 
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involvement in the Netherlands and acceptance of the likelihood of war with Spain—
though she would certainly continue to delay that war as long as possible.   
Even though this move was offensive, Elizabeth still shrouded it in a flurry of 
diplomatic activity expecting, or rather hoping, to continue to avoid war through 
diplomatic means.  On 18 January 1569, Elizabeth wrote to Philip expressing sorrow 
for the “turbulent condition” of his Dutch territories.142  After this opening, she 
complained of Alva’s seizure of English goods and men “in direct violation of 
different treaties.”143   She closed the letter by expressing her “good will and desire 
for keeping peace.”144  Elizabeth showed Philip that she regretted recent events 
though she felt she had reason to act as she did, and she also showed that she 
remained open to negotiations with the King. 
 The closing months of 1568 had a profound effect on English policy in 
coming years.  The events at San Juan and Elizabeth’s response demonstrated the 
inevitable intertwining of the issues of maritime law and foreign policy.  It was quite 
clear from this point on, policies towards the Netherlands, towards pirates, and 
towards Spain could no longer be separated despite Elizabeth’s rhetorical efforts to do 
so.  Elizabeth could no longer ignore attacks on Spanish shipping and constantly had 
to answer Philip’s complaints and demands for reparation.  More importantly, piracy 
had now developed into an official aspect of the Queen’s policy and she devised new 
ways of exploiting it.  Legal distinctions helped Elizabeth maintain her public, neutral 
position towards Spain alongside her behind-the-scenes efforts to undermine Spanish 
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power.  Furthermore, this legislation increased Elizabeth’s authority over matters of 
the state without her having to rely on and acquiesce to Parliament. 
 By 1569, all of these issues had also become entangled with religion, trade, 
and diplomacy.   One example of the intertwining of these events can be found in the 
Northern Rebellion of 1569.  A group of nobles, encouraged by Spain and Pope Pius 
V, began a rebellion to overthrow Elizabeth.145  The pope had even expressed his 
intent to issue a formal bull denouncing Elizabeth.  On 25 February 1570, Pope Pius 
issued the Regnans in Excelsis bull excommunicating Elizabeth and any subject who 
remained loyal to her.146  Unfortunately for the rebels, the bull did not become public 
until after the rebellion had already been put down.  Elizabeth had called for the 
surrender of the rebel earls on 22 December 1569.147  By 30 December, most of the 
rebels were in custody.148  The rebellion found less support than Spain and the pope 
had anticipated—due in large part to the policy of non-resistance and civil obedience 
voiced by earlier Catholic officials. 149   Perhaps because of the failure of the 
rebellion, Philip denounced the papal bull and thereby kept his peace with 
Elizabeth.150 
De Spes wrote to Philip that the English “demand [that they] shall enjoy their 
liberties…that they shall be free to go with merchandise to the Indies, and neither in 
Flanders nor in Spain shall they be molested in person or property for their 
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heresies.”151  According to de Spes, these were “absurd pretensions,” just as the 
previous arguments of the English to trade rights upon the sea were fallacious and 
illogical.152  Philip also thought it absurd that the English ambassador expected to 
follow his own religion in Spain since the Spanish Inquisition was meant to make the 
position of heretics intolerable in Spanish dominions.153  Philip expanded his 
restriction to Spanish colonies thus attaching religious justification to his prohibition 
of English trade “on pain of death.” 154   
Following these principles, Philip also expelled Elizabeth’s ambassador Dr. 
John Man from Spain.  “That dogmatising scamp,” as Philip called him, had no 
entitlement to insist upon his right to English church service or to make disrespectful 
comments about the pope.155  As Pollard claims, this policy “provoked the counter-
resolve to make an end of Spanish dominion” whenever and wherever possible.  
Increasingly aggressive English commercial expansion assumed a “character of a 
political and religious contest” lacking elsewhere for the English (particularly 
referring to the Netherlands).156  Even so, English maritime expansion remained more 
political than religious.  Englishmen could use religious beliefs as justification for 
encroaching upon and raiding Spanish shipping but anticipated revenues outweighed 
religiosity.  Philip continued to deny Englishmen trading rights but English 
privateers, encouraged by Elizabeth, continued to defy his authority to do so. 
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In 1569, Elizabeth found herself at another important crossroad.  She had 
encouraged sailors and pirates like John Hawkins and Francis Drake to continue 
trading in and with the Spanish colonies but Philip had become much more vocal and 
threatening about the consequences of these actions should Elizabeth openly support 
such a policy.157  Such complaints had led to back-and-forth seizures of ships and 
embargoes.  Even official commissions based on documented reprisal hearings did 
not change the matter.  Though much of her council pushed for a continuance of these 
and even more aggressive policies, Elizabeth still did not believe that her forces could 
withstand a war with Spain at this time.158   
In light of all this, in August 1569, Elizabeth and her council issued a 
proclamation “against the maintenance of Pirates.”159  The proclamation called for the 
“staying, ceasing, and suppressing of all occasions of piracies” and for the 
prosecution of those who received “private gain or favor by feigned colors or 
pretence of ignorance” in cases against pirates.160  Additionally, Elizabeth declared 
that citizens could not offer provisions or relief to “[any] maner of person coming 
from the sea” unless the merchants unloaded their goods according to the laws of the 
land and captains paid duties on their goods.161  These measures targeted corrupt port 
officials and local Admiralty court judges and provided evidence of rampant 
corruption.  With this proclamation, Elizabeth also made citizens accountable for the 
continuance of piracy by ordering that any merchants who ignored port and piracy 
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laws would be prosecuted as pirates themselves.  Such a position constituted a severe 
departure from established practice before 1569.  Not only was the government 
targeting pirates, but also those who enabled them.  There was a need to curb piracy 
and since previous legislation had not deterred pirates, the government had to find 
another way to do so.  By undertaking a campaign against the infrastructure of piracy, 
Elizabeth and her council hoped to weaken support for piracy and assert her authority 
at the same time.  These proclamations were not aimed at eliminating piracy 
altogether.  Rather, as with the previous proclamations of 1558 and 1560, Elizabeth 
aimed to focus acts of piracy against non-English shipping and, by offering legal 
recourse/legitimacy for pirates, she hoped to bring pirates more under her control—
fostering a sort of allegiance in exchange for this legitimacy and remission of 
punishment.  These actions did not constitute a constructive response to Philip’s 
entreaties.162   
But there was yet another purpose behind this proclamation.  In light of the 
success of the Sea Dogs,—men like Hawkins, Drake, and Martin Frobisher who 
constantly sailed the Atlantic in search of Spanish ships to attack in the name of 
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England—a large number of former pirates saw a way to become legal and make 
money at the same time by simply gaining commissions from the Crown and 
confining their exploits to Spanish shipping.  Supporting this claim, Gosse claimed 
that: 
If Elizabeth was on the whole severe with pirates operating in home waters, 
she was more than indulgent with those who venture further afield.   As the 
national hostilities with Spain increased, she shut her eyes to their aggressions 
against the Spaniards.163 
 
By issuing such a proclamation, Elizabeth not only addressed the complaints of her 
own subjects, but more importantly, she publicly addressed the complaints of the 
King of Spain.  Philip could not argue that Elizabeth had not made an attempt to curb 
the practice of piracy by Englishmen.  England’s Admiralty Court remained rife with 
corruption and a system of bribes and favors persisted.  Pirates also skirted this 
legislation quite often by operating with letters of reprisal.  The majority of pirate 
legislation in England from 1568 until the early 1580s served more to appease Spain 
than actually address problems in English ports.  And, as always, behind the obvious 
aims of this legislation in regards to Spain, it also served to strengthen Elizabeth’s 
control over her subjects. 
 Ostensibly, these reforms did work.  A 1570 proclamation claimed that “no 
manifest Pirates [were] known at this present to resort [or report] to any her Majesty’s 
Ports.”164  Those found had been executed.165  To ensure continued success in 
capturing pirates, Elizabeth ordered that previous proclamations be “newly published 
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observed.”166  This proclamation actually asserted that previous legislation had 
reduced piracy.  This assertion, in part, served as an answer to Philip’s complaints 
that piracy remained unchecked in English waters.  However, the success claimed in 
this 1570 proclamation does not seem evident in yet another proclamation of 1 March 
1571.   
In this document, the Queen “command[eth] all the Sea Rovers, commonly 
called Freebooters…to depart, and avoid all her highness’ Ports, Roads, and Towns, 
with all speed…not to return to any of the same again.”167  As stated in previous 
proclamations, any of these “Sea Rovers” or pirates that were captured, would forfeit 
their ships and goods and face imprisonment.168  As “manifest breaker[s] of the 
common peace between the Realme and other Realms and Countries,” these men 
would also find themselves subject to martial law, not just the civil law of the 
Admiralty Court.169  Concluding this proclamation, Elizabeth stated that any English 
who, found assisting the Freebooters, denied his involvement, would “suffer death by 
Martial law.”170  Confession meant a pardon for their offenses.171  Still, as ever 
before, little evidence exists to suggest that Elizabeth or the courts spent a great deal 
of time and energy enforcing these laws.  Piracy against English shipping dwindled 
but attacks on Spanish shipping did not.  In fact, they multiplied prompting Don 
Gerau De Spes, the Spanish ambassador, to write in 1570 that: 
The whole Channel from Falmouth to the Down is infested…They [pirates 
and rovers] assail every ship that passes, of whatever nation, and after 
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capturing them equip for their own purposes, by this means continually 
increasing their fleet, with the intention on the part of the queen thus to make 
war on his majesty through these pirates without costing her anything and 
under the specious pretence that she is not responsible. 172 
 
De Spes hit on the Queen’s exact intentions.  With her own navy in disrepair she did 
not have the strength to oppose Spain openly but pirates could fight her war for her.  
Philip seemed to share de Spes’ opinion.  Writing to Alva in January of 1570, 
Philip “angrily” reminded his commander of the recent confiscation of Spanish goods 
(the Genoese loan).  He also reminded Alva of the fact that Elizabeth had welcomed 
Dutch rebels and had “licensed attacks on any ships sailing through the Channel 
under Spanish colors.”173  Philip claimed that: “By contrast, the damage which she, 
her kingdom and her subjects have received from us is so little that it hardly 
counts…so that one could justly say that she has declared war on us, but we are at 
peace with her.”174  Claims in the Admiralty Court and Privy Council for Spanish 
losses for these two years alone were in the hundreds of thousands of pounds.175 
Seeming to have forgotten the Spanish attack on John Hawkins two years 
prior, Philip disregarded his own culpability in the situation.  Still, neither side 
declared war and Elizabeth continually issued proclamations that ostensibly 
addressed Spanish complaints.176  Philip had reason enough to justify war against 
England based on Hawkins’ attack at Plymouth, the seizure of the Genoese loan, 
English aid to Dutch heresy, and constant privateering.  The English could just as 
easily argue that the Spanish had been at fault in Plymouth for not observing common 
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practice.  Though the legal explanation of the Genoese seizure was shaky, the English 
could argue that the Spanish responded hastily.  English aid to the Dutch remained an 
unofficial policy of Elizabeth’s and Philip would have to have expended even more 
effort to dredge up and document irrefutable proof of the Queen’s involvement in 
order to declare war upon her.  And, as had been discussed, Elizabeth did make public 
and official shows of addressing privateering complaints, though her sincerity in their 
enforcement was certainly questionable.   The fact that Elizabeth was so careful to 
avoid appearing aggressive or confrontational coupled with the selective language of 
her proclamations kept Philip at bay—at least for a time.  Philip had also seen the 
failure of the 1570 Papal Bull in its attempts to incite rebellion in England and oust 
Elizabeth.  Philip had to make sure that he had substantial justification and proof of 
English aggression if he decided to declare war so that his efforts would garner more 
support than attempts such as the Northern Rebellion. 
Along with all of this, Philip faced growing deficits, continuing difficulties in 
subduing the Dutch, and growing threats in the Mediterranean.  Elizabeth had only a 
small military and was only just beginning to see some profits from her privateering 
investments.  Both sides continued to make outward shows of peace while working 
covertly to weaken each other’s power.   
Based on correspondences from his ambassadors, Philip did not believe that 
Elizabeth truly meant to enforce the piracy policies she enacted, but the appearance of 
intervention might be preferable to open war.  Aside from Philip’s problems in the 
Netherlands, he also faced an ever-growing threat from the Ottoman Turks in the 
Mediterranean.  The Ottomans had conquered much of Bohemia and even marched 
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on the city of Vienna in 1570.  Expanding their dominions also meant expanding their 
influence over trade.  Venetian trade dwindled as the Turks took over all trade routes 
east to Asia and India.  Practically all of Europe had depended on and/or benefited 
from the Venetian-Asian trade.177  As Spain was the most powerful nation in Europe 
with the greatest resources, including the formidable Armada, the Pope called on 
Philip to make a crusade against the Turks.178   
On 7 October 1571, Philip’s Armada under the command of his half-brother 
Don Juan of Austria sailed into the Eastern Mediterranean and defeated the Turkish 
forces at Lepanto.179  The victory earned the Armada the moniker “the Invincible 
Armada” and solidified the position of Spain as the most powerful European nation as 
well as made Philip the true defender of the Christian Faith in the eyes of Catholics.  
While Philip gained even more prestige through this venture, he also gained more 
responsibility and yet another cause to uphold.  A very “hands-on” ruler, Philip found 
himself stretched thin simply going over all of his council’s domestic business let 
alone the correspondences of his foreign ambassadors.  All of this, on top of the 
rebellion in the Netherlands, the harassment of Spanish ships in the Atlantic by 
English privateers, and constant pressure from the Pope for an “Enterprise of 
England,” kept Philip and Spain too distracted to effectively deal with any one issue.  
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Because of his many obligations and various spheres of engagement, Philip actually 
took a cue from Elizabeth and became more involved in covert actions towards 
England.   
Most of Europe saw Elizabeth as a heretic who should not occupy the throne 
of England.  Since 1568, the Pope had pressured Philip to invade England.180  By 
1569, Philip considered, “for the first time in ten years,” ways to restore Catholicism 
in England by force if necessary.  He wrote in that year: “it appears to me that, after 
my special obligation to maintain my own states in our holy faith, I am bound to 
make every effort in order to restore and preserve it in England as in former times.”181  
In January 1570, Philip wrote to Alva about his frustrations with Elizabeth and her 
policies.  Feeling that the Queen had already declared war upon Spain, Philip 
reiterated his belief that his position “required” him to defeat Elizabeth and place a 
Catholic queen in her stead.182  Writing again to Alva in the Netherlands (from 
whence the invasion of England would most likely begin), Philip claimed that he had 
to intervene to liberate Mary since 
God has already granted that by my intervention and my hand that has 
previously been restored to the Catholic faith once…Certainly we [Spanish 
Catholics] could not avoid remaining with great guilt in our souls and great 
regret, if because I failed that queen [Mary] and those Catholics—or, rather, 
the faith—they suffered and she was lost.183 
 
Pope Pius V, pleased that Philip had finally made up his mind about the 
English crusade, supported the King and the cause by issuing a papal bull in April of 
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1570 that excommunicated Elizabeth and deprived her of all political authority.184  
Philip did not rejoice at this act.  Rather, he regarded the bull as an attempt to force 
him into action against England before he had sufficiently prepared and therefore did 
not allow its publication in his territories.185  Despite Philip’s aversion to the bull, it 
fostered a policy of resistance in English Catholics rather than the policy of non-
resistance that they had practice for the previous decade.186  Catholic opposition to 
Elizabeth was now legal and even necessary.  More importantly, the issuance of this 
bull initiated the debate over the succession of Mary Stuart throughout the courts of 
Europe.  This was no longer just an English or an English-Spanish issue, it was an 
issue for every Protestant and Catholic in Europe.  And so the plots against 
Elizabeth’s life and throne began. 
 From 1570-1572, Philip was involved in numerous conspiracies against 
Elizabeth centering on Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots.  The heir of James V of Scotland 
and the French Mary of Guise, widow of Francis II of France, and cousin to 
Elizabeth, Mary occupied an unparalleled political position in Europe.  At one time, 
she could claim the right to three separate thrones.  Raised as a Catholic in the French 
Court, Mary caused Elizabeth no small amount of concern.  If Mary could somehow 
gain the support of France or Spain, she could possibly usurp the throne of England 
and throw the country into religious turmoil once more.  Mary did not have to look 
for support.  It came to her.  Philip and his general Alva were implicated in practically 
all of these plots with Mary Stuart, but one of the most notorious was the Ridolfi plot 
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of 1570.  Roberto Ridolfi, an Italian banker from Florence, brought Philip a plan 
involving an English Catholic rebellion, invasion of England, assassination of a 
queen, and the installment of Mary Stuart as Queen of England.  With the help of the 
Alva, Ridolfi pushed for an invasion of England from the Netherlands that he claimed 
would be accompanied by an uprising of Catholics in England and Ireland such as 
Norfolk’s Rebellion in 1569 (also referred to as the Northern Rebellion).187  Philip 
agreed to support the plan only after such an uprising occurred.  Alva informed Philip 
of his skepticism about the reliability of Ridolfi, but the two continued their 
involvement in the development of the plot.188  Philip felt it his duty to restore 
Catholicism to England and if he could so without waging a large scale war, all the 
better.  In 1571, the Duke of Tuscany, having learned of Ridolfi’s plans, informed 
Elizabeth of the plot.189  Ridolfi escaped punishment for his part in the plot as he was 
in Paris when his messenger confessed and the conspirators were placed under arrest.  
Elizabeth also expelled Don Gerau de Spes, the Spanish ambassador also implicated 
in the plot.190  Mary remained in prison where she had been since 1567.191 
The issue of Mary, Queen of Scots was settled internationally in 1572.  
England and France met at Blois, France in April of that year to discuss a number of 
concerns.  First, the treaty severed French ties with Mary, “leaving [her] out in the 
cold.”192  In ending France’s Scottish alliance, the treaty also allowed Elizabeth free 
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reign to support James VI of Scotland, Mary’s Protestant son, with military assistance 
against various Catholic factions.193  Finally, France and England agreed to provide 
“mutual defence of both realms” without creating any sort of offensive against 
Spain.194  Upon returning to England, Elizabeth ordered the Dutch Sea Beggars whom 
she had allowed to use English ports since the Dutch Revolt to leave England.195  This 
action served as an attempt to once more placate Spain in the wake of the alliance.   
At this time, the arguably legitimate Queen of Scotland sat in an English prison.  
Many Catholics throughout Europe were upset by this fact, not just the Spanish.  
However, in light of the tensions between Spain and England, the issue of Mary 
occupied an important place in Philip’s correspondence.  Elizabeth’s expulsion of the 
Sea Beggars, she hoped, would assuage Philip against action despite his discontent 
with Mary’s situation.  England and Spain reached a truce in 1572 and thereby each 
nation discontinued arrests and restored commerce to its normal channels.   
For the first time, the Queen actually sent her ships out against Channel 
rovers.196  This campaign resulted in the capture of dozens of ships and hundreds of 
men proving just how easily Elizabeth could have dealt with “pirates” should feel so 
inclined.  But, it is right to assume that, just like her earlier piracy legislation, these 
acts were likely all for show to keep Philip off guard and stave off open war—
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Elizabeth’s primary aim throughout the first part of her reign.  However, at the same 
time that Elizabeth decided to “crack down” on piracy, her Sea Dogs and the banned 
Sea Beggars brought the maritime conflict between Spain and England to another 
critical point.  English privateers led the way.197 
Though Elizabeth’s piracy legislation served chiefly to appease Spain, her 
proclamations did attempt to correct the problem of piracy in England.  Elizabeth 
attempted to assert royal authority over English piracy and use it to her benefit.  As 
Gosse was quoted before, Elizabeth practiced more leniency towards pirates who 
ventured into Spanish waters than she did with pirates in English waters.198  Those 
pirates operating in international waters often became privateers and therefore gained 
exemption from Elizabeth’s piracy proclamations.  All of the proclamations from the 
1560s and 1570s dealt exclusively with pirates on the coasts of England.  In the 
context of international relations of the time, those captured as “pirates” were not 
generally Englishmen.  English sailors, for one, knew the Admiralty Court procedures 
and frequented ports where they knew the Admiralty officials.  Also, Elizabeth’s 
earliest proclamations provided avenues for English pirates to gain official letters of 
reprisal thus removing their “pirate” status.  The Spanish, of course, had little such 
insight into the English system nor did the English courts frequently offer them 
reprisal letters due to national hostilities. 
While Elizabeth did not attempt to prosecute pirates vigorously, she did make 
an effort to reform the Admiralty Court.  Every single proclamation mentioned in this 
paper ends with a warning to Admiralty officials that should they abuse their office 
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by aiding pirates or by not actively pursuing English pirates they “[would] answere 
[for their actions] at theyr uttermost peryll.”199  By the end of Henry VIII’s reign the 
Admiralty Court operated independently.  Cases tried in these courts only went to the 
state and King’s Courts if the offenses were particularly egregious.200  The same 
remained true under Elizabeth, but she made the officials subject to state law.201  
Upon her ascension to the throne, Elizabeth had hoped to focus primarily on a 
domestic agenda—strengthening and uniting the English nation that had suffered so 
much civil strife under her predecessors.  Streamlining and correcting the abuses of 
the court system was one of her priorities, but, as has already been argued, these 
domestic programs suffered at the hands of more pressing international affairs.202  It 
was not until the 1580s that the Admiralty Court began to undergo reform. 
Son of a court doctor to Mary and Elizabeth and an ambitious lawyer and 
statesmen, Julio Cesare Adelmere, known simply as Julius Caesar, was charged with 
reforming Elizabeth’s Admiralty Court.  In 1581, Caesar earned the appointment of 
“Commissioner for Piracy Causes.”203  When Caesar began his Admiralty career, 
pirates and local Admiralty official openly mocked Admiralty law.  In most coastal 
towns, intricate networks of investors, receivers of plunder, and suppliers of 
provisions existed with the active help of Admiralty officials who profited from their 
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assistance.204  Between 1558 and 1578, the courts executed no more than 106 English 
pirates.205  Even in 1578, out of over 900 pirate trials, only three men went to the 
gallows.206  One of Caesar’s first actions included establishing a system analogous to 
the system of public information already in place in England to discover pirates and 
their partners on shore.207  In exchange for testimony against such men, informants 
could claim up to two-thirds of the fines imposed upon the convicted.208  Still, one 
must always remember that only a fairly small percentage of sailors and merchants fit 
the legal definition of “pirates.”   
Caesar resented the issuance of such letters that deprived him of defendants.  
He claimed that these “private warrants or letters [were] in truth not warranted by the 
law.”209  He also claimed that the ease with which men obtained these letters “blunted 
and disgraced [the letters’ authority and purpose] in the opinion of the people.”210  
Furthermore, those in possession of such documents believed themselves (and in 
many cases were): 
[free] from the sharp warrants of the law [and] careless of [the authority] of 
the Judge and Lord Admiral…and use those private warrants as they list, and 
when they list, [so that the warrants are] rather as props to disordered 
affections than as mean means for the furtherance or execution of 
justice…which hath bred so general contempt in [England] as the like have 
not been seen in former times of peace.211 
  
Caesar wanted power and he not only lacked the means to assert that power, but he 
also saw his position undermined by the queen’s privateering policies.  On numerous 
                                                 
204 Williams, Sea Dogs, 149. 
205 Williams, Sea Dogs, 150 
206 Williams, Sea Dogs, 150.  See also Baker, The Office of the Vice-Admiral of the Coast. 
207 Williams, Sea Dogs, 150. 
208 Williams, Sea Dogs, 150. 
209 Quoted in Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 27. 
210 Quoted in Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 27. 
211 Quoted in Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 27. 
 
 64 
occasions, the Privy Council also intervened in Admiralty-reprisal cases in the 
interest of foreign relations.212  So not only did Caesar have to compete with 
individual ports for jurisdiction over trials, but he also found himself overruled by the 
Privy Council “in the interest of foreign relations.”213  Caesar’s complaints of state 
control over piracy issues suggest that Elizabeth had effectively asserted her authority 
in such matters through her various proclamations and licensing policies.  Perhaps 
Caesar felt that reprisal letters had served a purpose once, but in the 1580s, as he tried 
to make a name for himself in the Admiralty Court, Caesar saw these letters as a 
hindrance to justice and to his own pursuit of glory.   
Interestingly, Caesar did not maintain this outlook.  For one, in 1583, much of 
his discontent was overshadowed by his new appointment as judge of the High Court 
of Admiralty.214  In this new position of power over all the Admiralty Court and 
finding that Elizabeth supported his ideas on reform, Caesar reevaluated his opinions.  
In that same year, Caesar expressed a nationalistic attitude towards pirates for the first 
time.  When the queen’s ships captured seventeen rovers in 1583, the Privy Council 
interceded in their examination and this time Caesar agreed with the Council’s 
decision against mass executions.  The decision stated that because open war with 
Spain loomed near, the execution of a great reserve of skilled mariners that could help 
defend England would be a mistake.  Nine of the rovers were executed and the rest 
pardoned.215  However, this turn did not stop Caesar’s reforms. 
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In 1582, Elizabeth asserted her authority over Caesar when she suspended the 
jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court in all towns for the space of three years and 
offered immunity to pirates.216  Caesar wanted to establish a central Admiralty Court 
with over a hundred central commissioners and a traveling court circuits.217  Finally, 
the Queen allowed Caesar to begin his program in 1588 on condition that he fund it 
himself.  The Queen had disapproved of the project because of the strain she expected 
it to place on her treasury.218  It could also be argued that the Queen did not support 
such a program because a stricter, more observant Admiralty Court might hinder her 
privateers.  The privateers had contributed a great deal to Elizabeth’s treasury, 
reputation, and to the strengthening of England’s naval resources.  Elizabeth and her 
Council pardoned more sailors than Caesar approved of.  Caesar’s response was to 
write to the Council, saying that: “in answer to the complaint of depredations 
committed by English pirates… [in the future] all cases of piracy should be dealt with 
by the Lord High Admiral…and that his powers should be amplified accordingly.”219 
However much progress Caesar made in creating and enforcing law against 
pirates and piracy in the early seventeenth century, the decline of piracy came about 
thanks more to war with Spain in the 1580s and 1590s than to governmental policies 
and practices.  With the coming of war, the Lord Admiral, with the government’s 
backing, issued numerous licenses to merchant men and captains to attack and loot 
Spanish ships at sea in response to like acts by the Spanish upon English vessels.  
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Those prosecuted for the peacetime crime of piracy, were now heralded as wartime 
heroes.  Caesar also had to admit that these “wartime heroes” had done a great deal 
for England militarily and financially.  In 1590, Caesar wrote that “her Majesty hath 
gotten and saved…over two hundred thousand pounds” due to the issuance of reprisal 
letters and wartime letters of marque.220   
Caesar’s career in the Admiralty Court and English government had only just 
begun under Elizabeth.  After the Spanish war, he succeeded in rooting out hundreds 
of pirates from England as well shutting down several “pirate bays.”221  Little 
scholarship exists on the early career of Caesar under Elizabeth and studies of his life 
and work under the Stuart monarchs are still few and far between.  Caesar appears as 
a side note in a number of works on Elizabeth government, but even in the majority 
of studies on the maritime expansion of the Elizabethan Age and the legislative 
reforms and innovations of Elizabethan England Caesar is too often ignored.  
Granted, Caesar obtained higher offices and more titles and power under the Stuarts, 
leading scholars to associate him more with this age than the previous, but his role in 
the Court of Admiralty under Elizabeth served as yet another important innovation of 
Elizabeth’s foreign policy and statecraft.  Part of the reason that Elizabeth finally 
threw her support behind Caesar’s reforms lay in the fact that she wanted once again 
to make English seamen beholden to her.  She offered them letters of reprisals and 
commissions in earlier proclamations and in 1583, by allowing Caesar to increase 
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punishments and prosecution of pirates, she forced men to either suffer at the hands 
of the court or come to her for a legal way to continue their raids. 
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One of Elizabeth’s most famous privateers was Sir Francis Drake.  Like many 
others in the 1560s, he took advantage of the queen’s new maritime policies.  In 
looking at his Caribbean raids alone, the impact of the privateers as a means of policy 
becomes clear.  A fiery, unabashedly anti-Spanish sailor, Drake had accompanied his 
cousin John Hawkins on the “troublesome voyage” of 1568.  He used his experience 
at San Juan as a launch point for his personal privateering campaign in the Caribbean 
against Philip II from 1571-1573.  Drake took full advantage of the queen’s 
privateering policies and in turn helped prove the validity and success of those 
policies in undermining Spanish authority and weakening that great power. 
In 1571, Drake raided the towns of Nombre de Dios and Venta de Cruces near 
modern Panama.  General Diego Flores de Valdés had managed to keep the French 
and English pirates outside of the cities at bay in early 1571.  But, by March, he 
handed command over to his Admiral, Gerónimo de Narváez.222  The French had 
given up trying to take Venta de Cruces because of Valdés, but Drake paid close 
attention to the new general, recognized his impotence, and made the decision to raid 
the town.  A 1575 Spanish list of raids states that in 1571, “franciso drak” stole over 
50,000 ducats worth of goods.223  (pound to ducat exchange rate?)  The merchandise 
and slaves acquired by the English grew to such a load that the ships could not even 
hold it all and the English had to find places to sell some of their goods before they 
could even set sail.224 
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Sir Francis Drake Revivied presented Drake’s voyage to the Indies in 1572-
1573 as an expedition of revenge and retribution against Philip and the Viceroy 
Enquiquez of San Juan.225  On 24 May 1572, Drake sailed once again for Nombre de 
Dios.226  Much more care and planning went into this mission than Drake’s previous 
raids in Panama.  After scouting the location offshore for a number of days, Drake 
landed his ships at Port Pheasant some miles south of the city.  Drake assembled 
some men to help him scout the land and on their way they found a letter for Drake 
nailed to a tree.227  Written shortly before Drake docked at Port Pheasant, the letter, 
from another English captain John Garret, read: “Captain Drake, if you fortune to 
come to this port, make hast away, for the Spaniards which you had with you here the 
last year have betrayed this place, and taken away all that you left here.”228  Of 
course, upon hearing that Spaniards had betrayed him once again as they had in 1568, 
Drake furiously set about planning his raid of Nombre de Dios.  Personal emotions 
overlaid his purpose to disrupt Spanish trade and finances.  Unfortunately for Drake 
and England, this mission failed miserably and gained none of the gold anticipated.229  
Drake did manage to capture some Spanish ships as he left Nombre de Dios.230  Even 
though these raids were not dramatically successful, they offered Drake and his crew 
valuable experience in seamanship, supply, and siege tactics that would prove crucial 
in the coming years. 
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In 1573, Drake joined with a French fleet for a raid on Nombre de Dios—
specifically the mule trains there that would be loading and unloading the Spanish 
Plate Fleet’s stores of gold and silver.  Drake received news of that the Spanish fleet 
arrived on 5 January 1573.231  As Drake camped outside of Panama City planning his 
next move, he made alliances with the local cimaroons.232  This relationship proved 
very beneficial to Drake.  The cimaroons supplemented his dwindling manpower and 
had a valuable knowledge of the land that aided his planning.  Though a number of 
men were lost in this attack, the fleets made off with a good deal of gold and silver 
equaling approximately £20,000.233  What they could not carry they buried to recover 
at a later date.234  Passing Carthagena on his way out of the Caribbean, Drake rode 
boastfully in front of the Spanish ships there, sailing with his flag of St. George 
proudly displayed and every streamer, flag, and sail flying.235  Drake sailed back into 
England on 9 August 1573 a rich man with a growing reputation as a competent 
sailor, fearless leader, and, to Spanish authorities, a brutal corsair.236   
Even though these raids of 1571-1573 did not result in any resounding defeat 
of Spanish forces, they did put Philip on edge.  A young brash English captain had 
repeatedly sacked Spanish towns in Mexico, captured Spanish ships, and had made no 
effort to conceal his hatred of Spain.  Drake caused constant disruption in Philip’s 
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finances and communications.  In fact, these privateering voyages of Drake’s and 
subsequent expeditions inspired by him during these years, helped contribute to the 
bankruptcy of Spain in 1575.237  During the course of his Panama raids from 1571-
1573, Drake reportedly netted almost £40,000.238  Philip grew angry at these affronts 
(and the fact that his gold and silver was now used to pad his enemies coffers) and 
Elizabeth saw the power balance shifting in her favor. 
As a response to these English privateering missions, the Spanish occupied 
Netherlands prohibited all trade with that nation except under special license.239  
Once again, Elizabeth was forced to find new markets for English goods.  Again in 
1576, the Dutch declared a blockade of all “Spanish” ports.240  Elizabeth denied their 
right to do by saying that this action was not “in conformity with the Law of 
Nations.”241  Citing precedent and established practice, Elizabeth declared the 
Netherlands had no authority with which to declare such a blockade.242  The two sides 
seized one another’s ships within their respective ports (the Dutch followed by 
English retaliation and then Dutch retaliation) until Elizabeth’s advisor Walsingham 
convinced the Dutch to reply to Elizabeth that they would seek French help if she did 
not recall her threats of war and stand down.243  Walsingham supported English 
intervention in the Netherlands more than his queen.  Elizabeth was trying to play the 
                                                 
237 Of course, Philip’s expenditures in the Netherlands to pay and supply troops for nearly twenty years 
at this point also contributed to this state of bankruptcy. 
238 Williamson, Age of Drake, 128. 
239 Richmond, Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 13. 
240 Richmond, Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 14. 
241 Richmond, Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 14. 
242 Richmond, Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 14. 
243 Richmond, Navy as an Instrument of Policy, 14-15. 
 
 73 
Spanish and the Dutch off of one another and Walsingham took this opportunity to try 
and force her hand for aiding the Dutch cause.244   
War was headed off but resentment lingered.  On top of this disturbance, 
following Drake’s raids, the Spanish ambassador had applied to Elizabeth for the 
restoration of goods “illegally” taken.  Denying his claim, Elizabeth argued that the 
seizure of these goods had been a “justifiable retaliation” for Spanish assistance to 
Catholic rebels under English rule, as, for example, in the previously mentioned 
Norfolk’s Rebellion.245  Underlying this retaliation argument was the same argument 
already expressed by the English about their right to trade with any unoccupied 
territories, once again ignoring and rejecting the Pope’s right to partition the world 
between Spain and Portugal.246    
While Drake had camped outside of Panama City in 1573, the cimaroons had 
taken him to see a sight that would change Drake’s future.  On 11 February of that 
year, Drake had seen the “Great South Sea.”247  This experience convinced him of the 
possibility of sailing into those waters to reach the vast Asian empire of the Spanish.  
Now Drake planned to disrupt Spanish power in all waters.  By 1577, Elizabeth 
approved Drake’s proposed voyage to the East Indies that resulted in his 
circumnavigation of the world.248  Obviously, this expedition was meant to not only 
discover new trade opportunities for English merchants, but also to annoy Philip in 
the Indies as in the Caribbean.  Drake’s circumnavigation “stimulated enterprise, 
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showed a contempt for Spanish strength, and raised the reputation of England 
throughout Europe and made the various princes wonder whether Spain were not 
vulnerable.”249  Upon Drake’s triumphant return to England, he had amassed a 
fortune worth over £1,500,000.250  Elizabeth herself had a share in this voyage 
amounting to enough money to pay off the entire national debt with £42,000 left over 
to invest in the Levant trading company.251  Philip and his ambassador de Mendoza 
expressed their outrage at Drake’s actions.  As Elizabeth had already told them, she 
reiterated that the Spaniards had brought this upon themselves and forced her to make 
reprisal for the money she had to spend putting down Spanish-aided rebellions in the 
northern parts of her realm.252  Her response also included the knighting of Drake in 
1580 aboard his flagship, the Golden Hind.253   
Philip, already smarting from the losses to his colonies and his coffers, now 
had to face the affront that a Sea Dog had received knighthood for his plunder. Drake, 
the “Master Thief of the Unknown Sea,” as Mendoza had labeled him, and the man 
that Burghley thought of as a pirate, gained support from practically all Englishmen 
and therefore from the Queen.  Elizabeth was less than thrilled with some of Drake’s 
methods, but she could not argue with his results as they filled her coffers with 
treasure meant for Spain.  Englishmen gained strength on the seas and Elizabeth’s 
enemy lost thereby.  Elizabeth’s policies of supporting privateers had helped to 
drastically change England’s position in European politics.  Though she still tried to 
avoid war for another decade, Elizabeth had much more power with which to 
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negotiate.  Certainly, she had not expected nor approved of some of Drake’s tactics, 
but she could little argue with the unexpected success of his raids in weakening 
Spain.   
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The traditional date for the start of the Anglo-Spanish War is 26 May 1585. 
On that date, Spanish officials seized English ships in the port of Seville, Spain.  
Small skirmishes, embargoes, and seizures of goods had characterized the 
relationship between England and Spain for almost thirty years, but on this date, the 
King of Spain directed and organized an overt attack on his enemy. 254   What’s more, 
the King made no excuses for his actions.  He had finally committed to the 
“Enterprise of England” and no amount of diplomacy and political scrambling on the 
part of the Queen could delay it any more. 
Existing English accounts of the events in Seville come primarily from the 
one ship that escaped port—the Primrose.  As the Primrose unloaded her stores 
surrounded by several other English ships, a group of Spaniards dressed as merchants 
made their way towards the ships.  Upon entering the port, the Captain Foster of the 
Primrose had warned his men to keep a look out for anything suspicious.  The 
advancing group of Spaniards put all of the men on guard.  As the Spanish neared, 
many of the English sailors had taken station in the lower decks and fired on the 
Spanish through hatches.255  Once the “merchants” reached the English ship, a group 
of them boarded the Primrose, grabbed Captain Foster, and held daggers to his throat 
as they ordered the crew to surrender.256  By the evening, one Englishmen and several 
Spaniards lay dead on the decks.  The Englishmen rallied and attacked the Spaniards, 
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“[bundling] them over the side to be drowned.”257  As the Primrose raised her sails 
and began her getaway, Foster and his men heeded the cries of five Spaniards 
floundering in the water beside the ship.  This would be a lucky turn for the men—
one of those five was the Governor with his orders tucked in his boot.  To prove his 
own innocence in the matter once the ship had arrived in England, the Governor 
produced his orders which revealed the fact that the English ships had been seized 
“upon personal order of the King so as to provide shipping for an invasion of 
England.”258  Another of the Spaniards, upon interrogation in London, stated that the 
King “[meant] by this arrest to [frighten] the English from aiding [the Dutch].”259 
Within days of the Primrose’s return, Elizabeth commissioned Drake to 
organize a fleet to rescue the other English ships seized by Spain.260  By 1 July 1585, 
Elizabeth’s council had convinced her to broaden the scope of Drake’s mission in 
order to “cripple” the King’s invasion fleet before it was ready.  The Queen 
accordingly signed a new commission for Drake.261  Andrews does not believe that 
Elizabeth decided to accept war after the Seville attack.  He claims that merchants 
who lost goods in Spain, upon examination by the Admiralty and with sufficient 
proof of losses, received individual letters of reprisal to set forth armed vessels for the 
capture of Spanish goods at sea.262  Issuing individual letters acknowledged the 
attacks in Seville as “private wrongs” according to him, not “an act of war.”263  In 
light of the Queen’s orders to Drake, I have to disagree with Andrews’ assessment.  
                                                 
257 Woodrooffe, Enterprise of England, 163. 
258 Woodrooffe, Enterprise of England, 163. 
259 Parker, Grand Strategy, 174. 
260 Woodrooffe, Enterprise of England, 164. 
261 Woodrooffe, Enterprise of England, 165. 
262 Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 3. 
263 Andrews, Elizabethan Privateering, 3. 
 
 79 
Elizabeth had known for years that war would eventually come with Spain.  She had 
seen that despite her best efforts to maintain an outward show of neutrality and 
compromise, her acceptance and continuance of support for privateering endeavors—
coupled of course with her support for the Dutch—had pushed Philip to action.  
Philip had to deal with constant attacks on his Indies shipping which undermined his 
authority, weakened his finances, and brought criticism upon him from all of his 
Catholic allies who constantly badgered him to use his vast resources to squash the 
insolent English.264  Elizabeth’s privateering policies, however, had provided her a 
formidable “navy” with which to act. 
Drake’s expedition did not leave until September of 1585 due to Elizabeth’s 
indecisiveness as to exactly how she planned to wage war with the Spanish.265  Since 
his first objective was to recover the lost English ships, he decided to wait until Spain 
to stop at all.  Once there, he harassed the local governor at Vigo and learned that the 
English ships he sought had all either escaped or been released.266  So he began 
making his way towards the Caribbean where he developed a plan to attack San 
Domingo.   
The journey to San Domingo alone almost destroyed Drake’s men.  A few 
days after leaving the Cape Verde Islands, yellow fever struck the crews.267  By the 
time Drake reached his destination he had lost dozens of men and morale suffered.  
To let his crew recover and to supply his ships, Drake spent Christmas in St. 
Christopher.  By New Year’s, Drake was in sight of his target.  A captured Greek 
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pilot warned the English captain that the Spanish had erected defenses at San 
Domingo and prepared an arsenal to meet the English.268  Undeterred by such news, 
Drake landed a group of men at the mouth of the Hayna River approximately ten 
miles west of his the city.269  Having prepared all their defenses on the seaward side 
of the city, the Spanish found themselves were vulnerable.  Despite the fact that the 
English land troops had just marched for over four hours in intense heat through 
dense jungle and had not had a drop of water the whole time, the “inspirational” 
leadership of their commanders led them to victory.270  The Primrose journal reported 
that “the Spaniardes gave us the towne for a Newyeers gifte.”271  Spanish accounts 
did not hide their surprise.  One letter stated that “the city was entirely unprepared for 
this.”272   
Drake could never be described as subtle—he held a deep hatred of Spain and 
its subjects—and his ransom of San Domingo proved this fact once again in its 
ruthlessness.  But for Drake, and most Englishmen, that ruthlessness had the purpose 
of teaching Spain a lesson and letting Philip know that the conflict with England 
would be costly.  John Hooker, an Elizabethan lawyer and writer, stated that “Drake’s 
voyage in September 1585 inflamed the whole country with a desire to adventure 
unto the seas, in hope of the like good success [so] that a number prepared ships, 
mariners and soldiers and traveled every place where any profit might be had.”273   
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Overall, Drake’s raids succeeded and though the investors in the expedition 
and the sailors received a relatively small return, this expedition did much to discredit 
Philip financially as well as militarily.  Still hoping to avoid war, Elizabeth sent Philip 
a letter of apology for Drake’s conduct saying that she had sent him orders to avoid 
any hostility.  However, she added that she could not disarm her ships nor prohibit 
her subjects from trying to recoup their losses by reprisals so long as Philip made 
plans to invade England.274  By 1586 the bank of Seville and Valencia went 
bankrupt.275  The Venetian ambassador Paravici wrote to Walsingham on 11 
September 1587 that: 
As to the voyage of Sir Francis Drake, I have always considered the 
disturbance, the loss and diversion of the enemy as much as the booty which 
he might bring: because from these result in so many ways such advantages as 
are of the highest importance to the conclusion of the War.  Since he [the King 
of Spain] thus loses much of his revenues, greatly increases his expenses, and 
occupies so many of his men of which at present he is very short.  It being 
certain that one year of War in the Indies will cost the Spaniards more than 
three in the Low Countries.276 
 
All money to the Netherlands stopped and the so far successful Spanish advance there 
stalled.  Philip found his great Spanish forces struggling on two fronts.  Elizabeth’s 
support of privateers (incorporating numerous English “pirates”) over the previous 
decade helped her sailors gain valuable experience in seamanship and gunnery which 
they made good use of against the Spanish in 1587. 
Englishmen and Spaniards alike expected raids on colonial outposts but in 
April of 1587 Drake’s fleet sailed into the Spanish port of Cadiz to begin waging war 
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on Spain.277  On 9 April 1587, the Queen sent a Privy Council-signed letter partially 
countermanding Drake’s commission from March.  The Queen certainly knew that 
Drake had left England but this letter could be used for deniability to Spain.  In the 
letter, Elizabeth encouraged Drake to: 
doe your best endeavor…to get into your possession, avoiding as much as 
may lie in you the effusion of Christian blood, such shipping of the said Kings 
or his subjects as you shall find at seas; either going from thence to the East or 
West Indies or returning from the said Indies into Spain…[and not to] enter 
forcibly into any of the said King’s ports or havens, or to offer violence to any 
of his towns or shipping within harbor, or to doe any act of hostility upon the 
land.278 
   
Basically, Elizabeth allowed Drake to seize as much shipping as he possibly could but 
to avoid violence and not repeat Santo Domingo.  When Philip’s complaints arrived, 
the Queen could produce this letter and claim that she had attempted to dissuade 
Drake. 
 By 19 April 1587, Drake caught sight of Cadiz Bay.  In the harbor 
before his fleet laid some sixty ships including a great Genoese argosy, one of the 
Spanish Armada commander Marqués de Santa Cruz’s carracks, and various ships 
loaded for the Indies and for the provisioning of the Spanish fleet at Lisbon.279  Elated 
by this sight, Drake rushed into the harbor “with more speed and arrogance than any 
pirate as ever shown.”280  On 27 April 1587, Drake wrote to Elizabeth from on board 
his ship, the Elizabeth-Bonaventure: 
The 19th of April we arrived within Cádiz Road, where we found much 
shipping; but, among the rest, thirty two ships of exceeding great burthen, 
laden, and to be laden, with provision and prepared to furnish the King's 
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Navy, intended with all speed against England; the which, when we had 
boarded and there furnished our ships with such provision as we thought 
sufficient, we burned; and, although for the space of two days and nights that 
we continued there we were still endangered, both with thundering shot from 
the town, and assaulted with the roaring canons of twelve galleys, we yet sunk 
two of them and one great argosy, and still avoided them with very small hurt 
so that at our departure we brought away four ships of provision, to the great 
terror of our enemies and honor to ourselves.281 
 
The damage reported on the Spanish coast reached 300,000 ducats.282  If 
Philip had thought Drake audacious and bold before, this attack on Cadiz convinced 
him of that fact.283  The attack at Cadiz set the Armada preparations back a year.284  
The experience Drake and his men had gained during their privateering exploits in the 
Caribbean and the East Indies helped make these attacks successful.  Without such a 
privateer navy, Elizabeth could not have taken the offensive against Spain.  Of 
course, Elizabeth had still found a way to distance herself from the Cadiz expedition 
as part of her diplomatic maneuvering.   
Despite the devastation of Spanish ships in Cadiz harbor, the Spanish found a 
way to turn the incident into a victory for themselves by focusing on the fact that 
Drake had not actually taken the city of Cadiz.  One such account claimed: 
so valiant was the resistance made by Don Pedro de Acuna [a Spanish 
commander] that not only did the heretic fail to take Cadiz, but he lost many 
of his ships and a large number of Englishmen were killed.  Thus were the 
                                                 
281 Francis Drake to Queen Elizabeth.  Found through Hillsdale College.  
http://www.hillsdale.edu/personal/stewart/war/Navy2/1587-DrakeCadiz.htm. 
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thresholds of the gate of Spain watered with the blood of those wolves, in 
order that the scent might keep their fellows away from our doors.285 
 
This myth of Spanish victory may have helped Spanish morale, but Cadiz had only 
remained untaken because of Elizabeth’s orders.  The taking of the town would have 
been an unnecessary provocation.  The message had been sent that war with England 
would be unpredictable, costly, and Spanish command of the seas could not be 
assumed. 
If the “singing of the beard of the King of Spain” pushed back Philip’s 
preparation for war, it also assured him even more of its necessity.  In the familiar 
form of Mary, Queen of Scots in 1586-1587, Philip found even more justification.  
Always conniving, Mary wrote to Philip’s ambassador Mendoza in Paris in May 1586 
expressing her desire to name Philip as her successor instead of her son James.286  
Having suffered Mary’s constant intrigues and plots to overthrow her, Elizabeth 
finally signed the Scottish queen’s death warrant following this incident.287    Once 
her execution date was set, Mary wrote to Philip, the Pope, and any of Philip’s 
ambassadors that she could to make it known that she died as a Catholic martyr.288  
On 18 February 1587, Mary was executed.289 These were all last-ditch attempts to 
entice Spain to come to her rescue.  Philip did not come to Mary’s rescue but he used 
her execution as the ultimate justification for an invasion of England.  After all, Mary 
had appointed Philip her successor, and he, as the champion of Catholicism, an ally to 
the vigorous Pope Sixtus V and the newly strengthened Catholic League, as well as 
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the sufferer of repeated attacks of English privateers, had to respond to this outrage 
by the Protestant Queen of England.290  Pope Sixtus V also offered Philip financial 
support for the preparation of his Armada.291 
Elizabeth, elusive to the last, insisted that she was not explicitly involved in 
the decision to execute her cousin Mary, and that she had in fact been shocked and 
horrified by the execution referring to it as the “late accident of the Queen of Scots’ 
death.”292  Elizabeth had in fact known of the order for Mary’s execution—she had 
signed it.  However, as she often did, Elizabeth gave no specific instructions as to the 
delivery of the letter—no directions for its delivery or enactment.  A secretary by the 
name of Davison, quite possibly at the behest of some of Elizabeth’s closest advisors, 
delivered the warrant straightaway.  For his action, he found himself on trial.293  
Davison was sent to the Tower.294  Elizabeth’s ambiguity and misdirection in this 
matter was a ploy to help her avoid censure particularly from the French, so often 
allied to the Scots, and from the Scots themselves.  Philip actually used the execution 
as moral justification for the invasion of England.295 
The execution of Mary, in fact, mirrored Elizabeth’s policies towards 
privateering.  Every move Elizabeth made was calculated and well thought out.  
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There had been numerous reasons for Elizabeth to have Mary killed for years before 
the execution actually took place.  The reason that Elizabeth finally decided on this 
course of action in 1586-1587 rested in the fact that Philip had taken official steps 
towards war in 1585, and thanks to English privateers, Elizabeth hoped she had the 
naval strength needed to withstand a Spanish offensive.  Mary was no longer of use to 
Elizabeth, who prepared her privateer navy for the long anticipated Spanish attack. 
 
 
 
  
Conclusion 
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The issuing of letters of marque during wartime has been common practice 
throughout history.  However, the extent to which Elizabeth used her privateers in the 
buildup to war was indeed remarkable.  For her, piracy and privateering were not 
solely “incidental concomitants of war” but rather a necessary and very profitable 
military tactic.296  Her letters of marque and commissions were generally so vague 
that they resembled simple reprisal letters.  Complaints from England’s enemies 
could be lost in the legal system due to this ambiguity and to the fact that England 
controlled the court processes.  Elizabeth was fully aware of England’s weaknesses 
and used her privateers to allow her time to correct those deficiencies.  The image of 
Elizabeth that has survived the centuries is often that of a very shrewd, calculating 
politician.  Her public policies in conjunction with (and often in seeming opposition 
to) her private policies of encouraging and supporting the actions of privateers prove 
that perception.   
 Though the prevalence of piracy with its flaunting of authority had seemed 
emblematic of weak royal power, the end results of piratical practices as they became 
state-sanctioned and controlled under Elizabeth proved decisive in the war with 
Spain.  Besides achieving the defeat of Spain, crown finances benefited from 
privateering missions.  In the 1540s the English treasury was in dire straits, but by the 
1580s, Elizabeth had filled her coffers with tremendous gains from her investments in 
privateering missions.  With profits from privateering, Elizabeth, for one, invested in 
the Levant Company which established English trade in the Mediterranean.  The 
profits from the Levant Company were then used to finance the East India Company, 
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one of the most successful trading companies in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century.297  
The contribution of English pirates to the development of English naval 
supremacy and the British empire cannot be denied.  The establishment of privateers 
helped defeat England’s greatest enemy, alleviated the crown’s financial conundrums, 
and set in motion a chain of events that would create the great British Empire of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Elizabeth’s privateering policies constituted her 
most constant and successful foreign policy despite its simple beginning as a way to 
circumvent Parliament and gain support for the new queen’s rule.  Privateers 
weakened Spanish power, disrupted Spanish finances at home and in the Netherlands, 
and formed the basis of a revitalized and much more efficient and experienced Royal 
Navy without Elizabeth having to publicly or aggressively pursue such issues.  Being 
able to pursue such ends fairly quietly, Elizabeth avoided open war for thirty years 
and made England better prepared for the fight when it came.   
In using the existing strengths of English to create a privately funded, if 
difficult to control, navy, Elizabeth also created a new model of government.  In 
outsourcing naval operations to freelancers, she extended her royal prerogative 
among other things.  This endeavor inaugurated a new kind of partnership between 
the crown and entrepreneurs.  Granted, she did not begin her reign with any specific 
plan to use pirates, nor did she necessarily expect to extend and expand that policy in 
the beginning.298  However, once Elizabeth realized that she could control this policy 
without having to give in to the more radical demands made by her Parliaments, and 
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that in using pirates as she was, she was creating a navy from already experienced 
seamen at no expense to the crown, she and most of her council embraced this system 
and made these men quasi-state agents. 
English privateers continued to play a significant role in the Anglo-Spanish 
conflict through the turn of the seventeenth century.  A number of privateers were 
knighted, gained peerages, and even more amassed significant fortunes.  Despite all 
the fame and respect many of these men had earned under Elizabeth and all that 
privateers had done for the English nation, when James I ascended the throne in 1603, 
privateers lost their favor.  Within months of coming to the throne, James issued 
proclamations reversing much of Elizabeth’s privateering policies.  Pirates who had 
become privateers under Elizabeth were now simply pirates again under James.  On 
the assumption that the main aim of privateers, chiefly the acquisition of booty, was 
the same aim as pirates, James refused to continue the issuance of commissions and 
letters of marque to merchant vessels that Elizabeth had practiced. 299  Approximately 
fifty thousand English seamen were affected by James’ legislation. 300  It is important 
to note that some of the men who had served as privateers before the Anglo-Spanish 
war, had returned to piracy in the 1590s due to the lack of opposing authority left 
after Spain’s decline, thus justifying some of James’ policies.  Still, the new Stuart 
monarch targeted all private sailors, not just those that had returned to piracy.   
In the wake of James’ proclamations, the English, who had grown accustomed 
to plunder at sea, found themselves forbidden from taking prizes under any 
circumstances.  A few English pirates gained letters of marque from foreign 
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countries, however, the English government soon issued another royal proclamation 
in 1605 stating that “all English subjects found serving aboard foreign privateers 
[would be] unhesitatingly treated as pirates.”301  Finding themselves outlaws once 
again, many English privateers and pirates left England for the Caribbean hoping to 
continue the lucrative lifestyle that had enjoyed for decades.  This new generation of 
English seamen helped to create the pirate culture so famous, or infamous, during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Though James revoked privateering licenses, he did sustain the general 
practice of crown licensure.  As Elizabeth had used reprisal letters and letters of 
marque as a means of extending her prerogative, James issued charters for colonizing 
expeditions and the establishment of plantations.  Similar to privateering missions, 
these colonizing voyages were largely privately funded.   Like his predecessor, James 
used licensure to circumvent a parliament he did not always agree with and establish 
his own prerogative at little cost to the crown.  The entrepreneurial partnerships of the 
crown with privateers under Elizabeth had proved successful and James used that 
same partnership idea in his own way.  It was this innovation that also greatly aided 
the creation of the British Empire.  Nations like France and Spain used government 
funds to finance expeditions and therefore financed only a limited number of 
endeavors.  England, on the other hand, by contracting out such missions, was able to 
have a greater number and variety of expeditions underway at one time without 
draining all of the crown’s finances.  In this atmosphere, Englishmen covered the 
globe. 
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